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 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.2 Background 
A Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) is an agreement between two countries for the 
reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other's 
territories by companies based in either country.1 Most analysts believe that the 
purpose of the BITs is to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the host country 
that is linked to economic growth while for the investor; the primary benefit is the 
protection that the BITs provide from the risks associated with investing in a foreign 
country.2 Such protection will vary depending on the terms of a particular BIT but 
most model BITs share six common core provisions that seek the protection from 
expropriation or nationalisation, most favoured nation treatment, national treatment, 
repatriation and investment of earnings, observation of contractual obligations, and 
dispute resolution.3 
The first ever BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959 and entered 
into force in 1962.4 Other states quickly followed the German-Pakistan example and 
many BITs were signed during the 1960s using a similar pattern.5 The BITs were 
entered into mostly between developing and developed countries, but the trend 
changed in recent decades as more BITs are being entered into between developing 
countries.6 Most BITs in existence in Africa were signed after the countries attained 
their independence. For example, after 1994 the South African government entered 
into a flurry of BITs with developed countries. These BITs were signed principally 
with European countries that were equally keen to support South Africa‟s transition 
                                                          
1
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ‘Investment Instruments Online’ available 
at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page1006.aspx (accessed 20 February 2015). 
2
 Ginsburg T ‘International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance’ 
(2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics 108. 
3
 Masamba M ‘Africa and bilateral investment treaties: to “BIT” or not?’ available at 
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1697:africa-and-
bilateral-investment-treaties-to-bit-or-not&catid=82:african-industry-a-business&Itemid=266(accessed 20 
February 2015). 
4
 Ghouri A A ‘The Evolution of bilateral investment treaties, investment treaty arbitration and international 
investment law’ (2011) 14 (6) Int. A.L.R 196. 
5
Ghouri A A ‘The Evolution of bilateral investment treaties, investment treaty arbitration and international 
investment law’ (2011) 14 (6) Int. A.L.R 196. 
6
 Masamba M ‘Africa and bilateral investment treaties: to “BIT” or not?’ available at 
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1697:africa-and-
bilateral-investment-treaties-to-bit-or-not&catid=82:african-industry-a-business&Itemid=266(accessed 20 
February 2015). 
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from apartheid, back into the community of nations, with a view of encouraging 
foreign investment in the new South Africa.7 Many countries followed a similar 
approach resulting in 1472 BITs being signed within the 1990s.8 Many of these BITs 
are still in force in this 21st century. 
In recent years, there has been criticism regarding the BITs that were signed prior to 
the 21st century that are still in force to date. As highlighted, by South Africa, for 
example, in the desire to attract foreign investment, insufficient heed was paid to the 
less obvious, and less attractive, consequences of those treaties.9 It is also argued 
that BITs restrict the policy space of a host state in favour of foreign investors.10 Host 
states have given up their sovereign right to pursue policy objectives due to the BITs 
that they signed. In addition, BITs have also been regarded as affording investors 
preference with corporate rights over public interest.11 Some lawyers believe that the 
first wave of BITs was signed too fast with text penned by a closely-knit group of 
western lawyers.12 Based on this belief, it is concluded that the majority of BITs 
reflect the texts developed to promote the 1960s anti-communist, post-
decolonisation protection agenda for European investors.13 
In addition to the criticism of BITs that has been highlighted, it is also important to 
include the fact that the number of cases brought to the International Convention for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) has also increased in the last decade. 
                                                          
7
Lang J ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties- a shield or a sword?’ available at 
http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/South-African-Government-Canceling-Bilateral-
Investment-Treaties.pdf(accessed 20 February 2015). 
8
Lang J ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties- a shield or a sword?’ available at 
http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/South-African-Government-Canceling-Bilateral-
Investment-Treaties.pdf(accessed 20 February 2015). 
9
Lang J ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties- a shield or a sword?’ available at 
http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/South-African-Government-Canceling-Bilateral-
Investment-Treaties.pdf(accessed 20 February 2015). 
10
 Masamba M ‘Africa and bilateral investment treaties: to “BIT” or not?’ available at 
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1697:africa-and-
bilateral-investment-treaties-to-bit-or-not&catid=82:african-industry-a-business&Itemid=266(accessed 20 
February 2015). 
11
 Masamba M ‘Africa and bilateral investment treaties: to “BIT” or not?’ available at 
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1697:africa-and-
bilateral-investment-treaties-to-bit-or-not&catid=82:african-industry-a-business&Itemid=266(accessed 20 
February 2015). 
12
Green AR ‘Bilateral investment treaties coming back to bite’ available at 
http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/Business/Legal-Bulletin/Bilateral-investment-treaties-coming-back-to-
bite(accessed 20 February 2015). 
13
 Green AR ‘Bilateral investment treaties coming back to bite’ available at 
http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/Business/Legal-Bulletin/Bilateral-investment-treaties-coming-back-to-
bite(accessed 20February 2015). 
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In the year 2000, there were less than 10 cases reported at ICSID but by the year 
2013, investors had initiated at least 57 known investor-state dispute settlement 
cases pursuant to International Investment Agreements (IIAs).14 This number came 
close to the highest number of cases that has ever been reported in a single year at 
ICSID.15 Some of the cases that were brought before the court included challenges 
to a broad range of government measures, including changes related to investment 
incentive schemes, alleged breaches of contracts, alleged direct or de facto 
expropriation, revocation of licenses or permits, regulation of energy tariffs, allegedly 
wrongful criminal prosecution, land zoning decisions, invalidation of patents and 
many more.16  The issues raised in these cases do not only indicate that BITs create 
risks that may result in dispute settlement proceedings but also indicate the potential 
for huge financial costs being incurred when disputes arise. The dispute mechanism 
could also be viewed as an infringement of the host countries sovereignty as 
disputes are settled in international tribunals and not the domestic courts.17 
In order to address concerns raised in some of these disputes, some countries have 
embarked on reviewing their BITs. These countries include the USA, Norway, 
Canada, South Africa and other states to mention a few.18 Other countries such as 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, have been very vocal in challenging investment 
protection regimes and have either terminated their BITs or have even gone as far 
as withdrawing from ICSID.19 In March of 2014, Indonesia decided to terminate its 
BIT with the Netherlands as of 1 July 2015 and has also indicated that it intends to 
terminate all of its 67 BITs.20 
                                                          
14
 UNCTAD ‘Recent developments in investor-state disputes ISDS’ Issue note number 1 April 2014 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf(accessed 20 February 2015). 
15
 UNCTAD ‘Recent developments in investor-state disputes ISDS’ Issue Note number 1 April 2014 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf(accessed 20 February 2015). 
16
 UNCTAD ‘Recent developments in investor-state disputes ISDS’ Issue Note number 1 April 2014 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf(accessed 20 February 2015). 
17
 Green AR ‘Bilateral investment treaties coming back to bite’ available at 
http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/Business/Legal-Bulletin/Bilateral-investment-treaties-coming-back-to-
bite(accessed 20 February 2015). 
18
 Green AR ‘Bilateral investment treaties coming back to bite’ available at 
http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/Business/Legal-Bulletin/Bilateral-investment-treaties-coming-back-to-
bite(accessed 20 February 2015). 
19
 Cotula L ‘Is the tide turning for Africa’s investment treaties?’ available at http://www.iied.org/tide-turning-
for-africa-s-investment-treaties(accessed 20 February 2015). 
20
Hovells, Nesbitt, Gonzalez et al ‘Indonesia terminates its Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) with the 
Netherlands from the 1
st
 of July 2015 and may terminate all of its BIT’s’ available at 
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The majority of countries that signed the 1472 BITs that came into force in the 1990s 
have not taken any action toward reviewing their BITs. Kenya is an example that 
currently has four BITs that were signed prior to the 21st century and date back to as 
early as 1970. These BITs have still not been subject to review. During the release of 
the 2014 Trade and Development Report, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) Secretary General Dr Mukhisa Kituyi, urged the 
Kenyan government to consider renegotiating decade-old bilateral agreements, 
arguing that they favour foreign investors at the expense of locals.21 In his speech, 
Dr Kituyi indicated that South Africa had set an example by going full-blown in 
throwing out decade-old agreements that favoured foreign investors thereby 
enabling it to rethink the agreements in a way that favours local industries.22 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The fact that some countries such as Kenya have not revisited the BITs that they 
signed prior to the 21st century presents a problem in itself given all the criticisms 
about the BITs highlighted above. Host countries need to be certain that the 
agreements they entered into decades ago are still reflective of the very same 
purpose that they sought when they signed the BITs. Moreover, the BITs should not 
create consequences detrimental to the host country that they did not envision when 
they signed the BITs. Countries such as Kenya should, therefore, revisit their BITs to 
see whether there are any problems emanating from them that they need to address. 
Given the fact that South Africa, among other countries, has already reviewed its 
BITs, Kenya may have to learn from South Africa‟s experience in coming up with a 
solution for its problems regarding its BITs. This thesis, seeks to highlight the 
problems with Kenya‟s BITs that were signed prior to the 21st century while taking 
lessons from South Africa‟s experience and recommending a course of action for the 
Kenyan government. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2a596886-3ad2-464b-a510-ab3b0cff503b (accessed 20 
February 2015). 
21
 Kariuki J ‘Kenya told to review bilateral trade agreements’ available at 
http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-told-to-review-trade-deals/-/996/2452122/-/hwnj81/-
/index.html(accessed 20 February 2015). 
22
 Kariuki J ‘Kenya told to review bilateral trade agreements’ available at 
http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Kenya-told-to-review-trade-deals/-/996/2452122/-/hwnj81/-
/index.html(accessed 20 February 2015). 
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1.3 Significance of the study 
BITs signed prior to the 21st century are problematic. Some countries with BITs 
signed during this period have since reviewed those BITs and taken action to 
address the disadvantages the BITs held for the host nation or have either resorted 
to eradicating some of their BITs. In particular, developing countries that signed BITs 
with developed nations seem to be disproportionately disadvantaged in these 
agreements. This thesis highlights Kenya‟s current BIT situation and compares it in 
light of another developing country, South Africa, with regards to its BIT experience. 
Given that South Africa has undergone an extensive BIT review process and moves 
to change some of these BITs, this thesis compares and contrasts the Kenyan and 
South African experience. The study highlights the possible lessons that could be 
learnt from the South African BIT review experience and provides recommendations 
for the Kenyan government regarding its outdated BITs. The lessons and 
recommendations benefit not only Kenya but also other countries that are still to 
review their BITs as it adds to the literature on why it is important for countries with 
such BITs to revisit them and how best they can go about the review mechanism. In 
addition, the study is also significant in that it raises awareness of the use and 
effects of BITs, thereby enabling countries that enter into such agreements to make 
informed decisions. 
1.4 Research Question 
Based on the problem that has been highlighted above, and the underlying 
assumption that Kenya needs to revisit its BITs, this thesis will answer the following 
primary question: How should Kenya revisit its BITs and what is the course of action 
for Kenya? 
In answering this question, other sub-questions will also need to be answered which 
are:  
i. What are the legal problems with the current BITs in Kenya that were signed 
prior to the 21st century and how may they affect Kenya? 
ii. What prompted South Africa to review its BITs and how did they proceed in 
reviewing the BITs. 
iii. What were the results of South Africa‟s review process and what measures 
were adopted? 
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iv. What lessons could Kenya learn from the South African experience and what 
is the recommended course of action for Kenya? 
1.5 Methodology 
The methodology used in developing this research is a desk and library literature 
study. This research is a comparative study with South Africa as the comparator due 
to the fact that South Africa is an example of a country that has reviewed its BITs 
and could provide guidance on the review mechanism for Kenya as well as providing 
lessons that Kenya could utilise in reviewing its BITs. The primary sources used in 
the research are mostly the BITs of both Kenya and South Africa together with 
several Acts of Parliament of both countries that have a bearing on the countries 
respective BITs. The secondary sources include books on international investment 
law, internet sources, journal articles and other publications. 
1.6 Chapter Outline 
This thesis comprises of five chapters. 
Chapter 1 
This chapter introduces the thesis with a background, the problem statement, the 
significance of the study, the research questions, the methodology and the chapter 
outline of the study. 
Chapter 2 
This chapter focuses on the BITs signed by Kenya prior to the 21st Century. There 
are four BITs that Kenya signed during this period. Each BIT will be analysed 
comprehensively in the context of Kenya‟s domestic legislative framework or 
domestic policies. The aim of the analysis is to examine the potential for legal 
problems that may arise from the BITs and how such problems might pose legal 
challenges for Kenya. 
Chapter 3 
This chapter will briefly introduce South Africa‟s BIT history followed by a description 
of the factors that prompted South Africa to review its BITs, the manner in which 
South Africa reviewed its BITs and the measures that South Africa implemented after 
review. The main focus will also be on the BITs that were signed prior to the 
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21stcentury by South Africa in order to provide a basis for comparison with the 
Kenyan situation. 
Chapter 4 
This chapter will compare the situation that exists in Kenya now, which has a bearing 
on its outdated BITs, to the situation that existed in South Africa prior to review. The 
aim would be to identify the factors that could also prompt Kenya to initiate a review 
process of its BITs. In addition, this chapter will highlight the possible lessons that 
Kenya could learn from South Africa‟s experience. 
Chapter 5 
This chapter will provide recommendations and the course of action for Kenya. It will 
also be the concluding chapter of the thesis. 
1.7 Definition of keywords 
Bilateral Investment Treaty: An agreement between two countries for the reciprocal 
encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other's territories 
by companies based in either country.23 
Foreign Direct Investment: The transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one 
country to another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth 
under the total or partial control of the owner of the assets24 
International Investment Agreements: Treaties between states that exist in three 
primary forms that are bilateral investment treaties, regional investment treaties and 
chapters of integrated trade and investment agreements that can be signed at the 
bilateral or regional level.25 
Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill: This proposed Bill is meant to provide 
for the legislative protection of investors and the protection and promotion of 
investment; to achieve a balance of rights and obligations that apply to all investors; 
and to matters connected therewith.26 
 
 
                                                          
23
UNCTAD ‘Investment Instruments Online’ available at http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page1006.aspx 
(accessed 20 February 2015). 
24
Sornarajah  M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3 ed (2012) 8. 
25
Mann H ‘International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities’ 
2008 IISD 3. 
26
 The Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill (GN 1087 in GG 36995 of 1November 2013). 
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Chapter 2: Potential legal problems in Kenya‟s BITs 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the four BITs signed by Kenya prior to the 21st Century. 
These BITs were signed with the Netherlands in 1970, Germany in 1996, Italy in 
1996 and the United Kingdom (UK) together with Northern Ireland (hereinafter 
referred to as the UK BIT) in 1999.27 Each BIT will be analysed individually with 
further comprehensive analyses in the context of Kenya‟s domestic legislative 
framework or domestic policies. The aim of this analysis is to examine the potential 
legal problems that may arise from such BITs and how such problems could pose 
legal challenges for Kenya. 
2.1 Brief overview of Kenya‟s BITs signed prior to the 21st Century 
Kenya‟s model BIT makes provisions for generally the same terms and does not 
deviate significantly from the typical modern BIT highlighted in the previous chapter. 
Allee and Peinhardt point out that there is a fallacy promoted that BITs are uniform 
when, in fact, each treaty has an internal balance that has been negotiated by the 
parties.28 Based on this fact, the four BITs signed by Kenya have minor differences 
indicating the varying interests or concerns of the parties that negotiated with Kenya. 
The differences mainly emanate from the manner in which the same provisions are 
phrased in the different BITs. There is also evidence of certain provisions found in 
certain Kenyan BITs that are not found in the others. With this in mind, the following 
section shall focus on analysing the provisions of the four BITs signed prior to the 
21st century in order to determine potential problems for the Kenyan government. 
 2.2 Analyses of Kenya‟s BITs based on legal interpretation 
This section will focus on the provisions relating to the definition of terms, the fair and 
equitable treatment, the protection and security standard, the national treatment and 
most favoured nation clause, the investor-state dispute resolution provision and the 
provisions that refer to a contracting party‟s national legislation particularly focused 
                                                          
27
UNCTAD ‘Investment policy hub’ available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/108(accessed 3 March 2015). 
28
 Allee T & Peinhardt C ‘Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Bargaining Over Dispute 
Resolution Provision’ (2010) 54 International Studies Quarterly 2. 
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on the legal interpretation of the BITs.  This analysis will search for potential problem 
areas in Kenya‟s BITs entered into prior to the 21st century. 
2.2.1 Definition of terms 
The terms defined in Kenya‟s BITs are not uniformly provided neither are they 
defined in similar terms. Despite such differences, all four BITs do, however, try to 
define at least either the term „investment‟ or „investor‟. The definition of the terms 
„investment‟ and „investor‟ are important because, from the perspective of a capital 
exporting country, the definition identifies the group of investors whose foreign 
investment the country is seeking to protect through the agreement, including, in 
particular, its system for neutral and depoliticised dispute settlement.29 From the 
capital importing country‟s perspective, it identifies the investors and the investments 
the country wishes to attract and from the investor‟s perspective, it identifies the way 
in which the investment might be structured in order to benefit from the agreements‟ 
protection.30 
Only the Netherlands, Germany and Italian BITs define who the investor is.31 These 
three BITs define investor with reference to the term „nationals‟ or „natural person‟, 
and „company‟ or „legal person‟. The definition of the term „national‟ or „natural 
person‟ in the three treaties merely requires that nationality be determined in terms 
of the laws of the country that the national claims to be from. This proves problematic 
in that it results in situations in which foreign investors who are not privy to the 
original BIT may seek to exploit the shortcomings of this definition by altering their 
nationality so that they benefit from the rights and protection offered under Kenya‟s 
BITs. Examples of such situations have been evident in cases such as that of 
Waguih Siag v The Arab Republic of Egypt.32 This case involved a situation in which 
an Egyptian national, who had investments in Egypt, lost his Egyptian nationality at a 
time when he had acquired Lebanese and Italian nationality in a manner that 
appeared to have been devised.33 The said claimant went on to claim under the BIT 
                                                          
29
Yannaca-Small C ‘Definition of Investor and Investment in International Investment Agreements’ 2008 
OECD9. 
30
Yannaca-Small C ‘Definition of Investor and Investment in International Investment Agreements’ 2008 
OECD9. 
31
Netherlands 14 (a) & (b), Germany Article 1 (3) & (4) and Italy Article 1 (2),(3) & (4). 
32
Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v The Arab Republic of Egypt ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15. 
33
 Qureshi K Q C ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs): The Essentials’ available at 
www.mcnairchambers.com/media/.../InvestmentTreatyEssentials_.pdf(accessed 3 March 2015). 
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that existed between Italy and Egypt as an Italian investor despite the fact that he 
had been an Egyptian national at the time the investment was made. This indicates 
that the manner in which the nationality requirement is phrased in Kenya‟s BITs has 
loopholes that may allow foreign investors from other countries that do not have BITs 
with Kenya to nonetheless benefit from Kenya‟s BITs. This presents a potential 
problem that may affect the Kenyan government in the event that investors from 
countries that do not have a BIT with Kenya devise methods to alter their nationality 
so that they take advantage of the protection offered by the Kenyan BITs. 
The UK BIT totally excludes the definition of the term „investor‟. This gives rise to the 
possibility of a broad range of interpretations of who may be considered as the 
investor. Without the definition of such a term in the treaty, it would be difficult to 
prevent investors from expanding the scope of International Investment Agreement‟s 
(IIAs) protection beyond that intended by the parties to the treaty.34 
Article 1 (a) of the UK BIT, Article 1 (1) of the Germany BIT and Article 1 (1) of Italy 
BIT define the term investment broadly by indicating that the term refers to any kind 
of asset and further lists the assets that are considered as investments. Such 
definitions conform to Peterson‟s view regarding some investment treaties that he 
claims to have been crafted in deliberately vague language, so as to cover the 
broadest range of investment situations.35 All three definitions of the term investment 
in Kenya‟s BITs further state that the highlighted list is not exclusive. Malik states 
that, such a non-exclusive definition was developed by capital exporting states to 
ensure that a wide variety of their investors‟ assets were protected in the territories of 
their capital importing treaty partners.36 This presents problems in that the non-
exclusive list could be interpreted to include anything from foreigners‟ money in a 
bank account, a holiday home, a company‟s goodwill, even contracts for the sale of 
goods manufactured by the investor in its home country, or services performed by 
the investor in its home country and then sold to consumers in the host country, to 
mention a few examples.37 Such assets would have little to no contribution to the 
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host state‟s economy or sustainable development and yet would still benefit from the 
heightened rights and protections offered by the investment agreement.38 
The Italian BIT sought to place a limitation on the interpretation of the definition of 
investment by highlighting that the investment must be made in conformity with the 
laws and regulations of a contracting party.39 Yackee refers to such provisions as „in 
accordance to‟ provisions and he is of the opinion that, relying on such provisions in 
BITs to provide tribunals with authority to take account of the issues in dispute would 
pose a number of interpretative and applicative uncertainties.40 He goes on to point 
out that such provisions typically do not mention which laws and regulations must be 
complied with.41 Kenya‟s Foreign Investment Protection Act (FIPA) is an example of 
Kenyan legislation that may be used in interpreting the BIT provisions relating to 
what constitutes an investment in Kenya. This Act provides that, for an investment to 
be approved it has to promote the economic development of the country or would 
need to be of benefit to Kenya.42 The application of this Act in the event of a dispute 
is not automatic not only because of the fact that it is not specifically mentioned in 
the treaties but also because of the manner in which tribunals have interpreted the 
„in accordance to‟ provisions in BIT arbitrations.  
In the case of Saipem S.p.A v Bangladesh, the tribunal indicated that Article 1 (1) of 
the BIT in issue that stated that investment had to be made in conformity with the 
laws and regulations of the host state does not limit the definition of investment 
under the treaty to investment within the laws and regulations of Bangladesh.43 In 
Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, the tribunal refused the respondent states argument that 
the technical defects in the restriction of the investment under Ukraine law denied 
the investment protection of the treaty.44 The dissenting arbitrator in the case of 
Fraport v The Republic of Philippines in dealing with the „in accordance to‟ provision, 
indicated that since the claimant‟s shareholdings constituted an investment covered 
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by the BIT in issue, the requirement that the investment shall be accepted in 
accordance with the Philippine law could not be interpreted as a jurisdictional bar.45 
All three of these cases indicate that the tribunal at ICSID may have jurisdiction 
regarding issues that may not even be considered as an investment in Kenya. This 
may be the case regardless of the fact that the majority decision in the Fraport case 
dismissed the case on the grounds that the investment had not been made in 
accordance with the relevant national laws.46 There is no rule of binding precedent in 
international investment law,47 and as such, tribunals may reach their own 
conclusions regarding the facts of a case. With such uncertainties, it is a risk for 
Kenya to maintain the provision in its current phrasing since it may result in 
interpretations that may not be in its favour. 
To add to the complexity of such broad definitions or a failure to define the term 
investment, it is important to highlight that foreign investors often make their 
investments through subsidiary companies incorporated under the laws of the host 
state.48 Without a specific agreement to the contrary, a locally incorporated 
subsidiary will not be able to bring a treaty claim against the host state.49 However, 
the foreign investor shareholder can bring a claim under an applicable treaty for 
damages with respect to its shareholdings.50 This has been evident in a number of 
cases against Argentina including the case of CMS Gas Transmission Co. v 
Argentina.51 In this case, the ICSID Annulment Committee noted that „the definition 
in the Argentina-US BIT which provided for “every kind of investment…owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly…such as equity, debt…” was very broad, and 
confirmed that investments made by minority shareholders are covered by the actual 
language of the definition as is also recognised by ICSID arbitral tribunals in 
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comparable cases.‟52 The wording in this Argentina-US BIT is almost similar to that 
found in Kenya‟s BITs. Argentina argued, in relevant part, that if the tribunals allowed 
minority or indirect shareholders to bring claims for relief based on damage to the 
company, host countries would be faced with a multitude of claims from different 
shareholders, as well as claims by the company itself.53 The tribunals, however, 
rejected those arguments in favour of a broad definition of investments and in doing 
so; they hung their decisions on the observation that there was nothing in the actual 
text of the governing treaties that imposed such a limitation.54 This indicates that 
Argentina had no intention of including minority shareholders as investments in its 
BITs and yet due to the phrasing of the definition of investment, the tribunal allowed 
such minority shareholders to bring a claim against Argentina. Kenya could also be 
subject to similar situations since Kenya‟s BITs that define the term investment, 
provide the same broad definition of the term as that found in the Argentine-US BIT 
that was at issue in the aforementioned case. 
2.2.2 Fair and equitable treatment 
The fair and equitable treatment is the second most important and common feature 
of BITs after the expropriation clause that is found in almost every BIT.55 The 
Netherlands BIT provides that:  
„each contracting party shall ensure fair and equitable treatment to the 
investments, goods, rights and interests of nationals of the other contracting 
party and shall not impair the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal thereof by those nationals, by unjustified or discriminatory 
measures.‟56 
This provision is also similar to that of Article 2 in the Germany, Italy and UK BITs. 
However, all four BITs fail to elaborate what the term fair and equitable treatment 
entails. 
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According to Peterson, investment arbitration can be plagued by a troubling lack of 
consistency in the interpretation of the substantive provisions in BITs from one case 
to the next.57 This is further supported by Schreuer, who states that with regards to 
the fair and equitable provision, the meaning will often depend on the specific 
circumstances of the case at hand.58 In S.D Myers v Canada, Metalclad v Mexico 
and Pope and Talbot v Canada, three tribunals provided three radically different 
interpretations of the same North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) fair and 
equitable treatment clause.59 With such uncertainties on how the provision in 
Kenya‟s BITs may be interpreted in the event of a dispute, it is a risk for Kenya to 
maintain the provision as it is without a further elaboration of the term.  
Furthermore, in cases involving Ukraine and Argentina regarding the fair and 
equitable treatment standard, the tribunals found that both governments had 
breached the standard by undermining the legitimate expectations of the investors.60 
The conclusions reached in these cases involving the two governments indicate that 
the governments were unaware of what the foreign investors‟ expectations were 
regarding the interpretation of the fair and equitable clause. As such, it is evident that 
without a clear explanation of what the fair and equitable treatment entails, the 
Kenyan government risks legal action from investors whose expectations of the 
provision may differ from what the Kenyan government envisaged when entering into 
these BITs.  
2.2.3 Protection and security clause 
The Germany BIT in Article 4 (1) and the UK BIT in Article 2 (2) provide that 
investments by nationals or companies of either contracting party shall enjoy full 
protection and security in the territory of the other. Green is of the view that this 
provision puts a hefty responsibility on the state to ensure that foreign investors‟ 
investments are protected.61 There has been evidence of this huge responsibility on 
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host states from a number of cases including the Swiss case against South Africa in 
which the South African government was mandated to compensate a Swiss investor 
who had acquired a game reserve in South Africa that was later subject to poaching, 
vandalism and theft.62 Algeria was also taken to tribunals to pay damages related to 
civil unrest during the civil war.63 Congo also faced claims for riots on the streets of 
Kinshasa.64 This presents a problem for Kenya in that; Kenya has security concerns 
that emanate from its neighboring country Somalia.65 Most notable has been the 
attack at Garrissa University College that occurred in April of 2015.66 Also of note, an 
attack in September 2013 on the prominent West Gate shopping mall that resulted in 
damage to property and left 71 people dead.67 Other security-threatening incidents 
occurred in 2010 and 2011 in which there were grenade attacks on a Nairobi 
nightclub, a bus station, refugee camps and towns near the Somalia border.68 
Reports indicate that to date, none of the attacks have been targeted at commercial 
projects or installations.69 In the event that such attacks are made on foreign 
investor‟s property, Kenya may be obliged by its pre-21st century BITs to 
compensate foreign investors. This presents a potential problem in that the attacks 
emanate from a country that Kenya has no control over and so as such, 
guaranteeing protection of investors‟ property is a huge responsibility for the state. 
Any failure to provide protection by the Kenyan government could prove costly for 
the country.  
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2.2.4 The national treatment and most favoured nation provision 
Kenya‟s BITs under consideration include the national treatment (NT) and the most 
favoured nation (MFN) clauses. The NT provision in Kenya‟s BITs requires the 
contracting parties to provide no less favourable treatment to foreign investors than it 
accords to its nationals. This provision applies regardless of the fact that the same 
foreign investors may be privy to forms of favourable treatment such as subsidies, 
tax holidays or regulatory exemptions that may not be afforded to local investors.70 
Not only does this create an unfair advantage to the foreign investors in this regard 
but it also constrains the promotion of local industries in developing countries such 
as Kenya which may need assistance to grow in order to compete with foreign 
companies.71 Moreover, the NT provision in Kenya‟s BITs does not contain the „like 
circumstances‟ clause which arguably implies that foreign investments that are not in 
like circumstances with the local investments in issue, could also be compared to 
find out whether NT has been violated.72 This presents a potential problem for Kenya 
in that the provision limits the policy space of Kenya in relation to its local 
investments and the provision may also be broadly interpreted to include unlike 
investments in the event of a dispute. 
The MFN clause in an investment treaty is fundamentally a promise between the two 
state parties to the treaty that neither state will give to investors from any third state 
more favorable treatment than that given to investors from the other state party to 
the treaty.73 This provision has been described as a core provision of international 
investment agreements that provides a basic minimum for the establishment of 
equality of competitive opportunities for investors from different countries.74 The 
wording of the provision in Kenya‟s BITs is similar in Article 3 of the Germany and 
Italy BITs and indicates that treatment that is awarded to nationals of third countries 
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should also be awarded to investors from the respective BIT signatories. The 
provision in both these treaties further indicates that the MFN principle does not refer 
to  
„the advantages and privileges which one contracting party may grant to 
investors of third states by virtue of membership of a customs or economic 
union, of a common market, of a Free Trade Area (FTA), of a multilateral 
economic agreement or under agreement signed in order to prevent double 
taxation or to facilitate cross-border trade.‟75 
Article 5 of the Netherlands BIT merely states that investors of the signatory states 
should not be treated less favorably than citizens of third states. The UK BIT in 
Article 3 does not provide a list of exceptions as do the Italy and Germany BITs do, 
but it indicates that, the MFN provision applies to Article 1-11 of the Agreement. 
The case of Maffezini v Spain concerned a dispute arising from the treatment of an 
Argentinean investor by Spanish entities in relation to the investor‟s production and 
distribution of chemicals.76 The claimant sought to avoid submitting the dispute to the 
Spanish courts for 18 months as mandated by the Argentina-Spain BIT before 
resorting to international arbitration.77 The claimant argued that the Argentina-Spain 
BITs MFN clause should allow him to import a dispute settlement provision from the 
Chile-Spain BIT, which merely required that the investors observe a six-month 
negotiating period before filing for arbitration.78 Spain argued that the MFN clause 
was confined to the investor‟s substantive economic treatment and did not extend to 
procedural matters.79 The tribunal in this case held that dispute settlement 
procedures were inextricably related to the protection of foreign investors envisaged 
under the BIT and therefore, the MFN clause should be applied to give the Argentina 
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claimant the benefit of the Chile-Spain BITs easier access to international 
arbitration.80 
The case above indicates how the MFN provision has been interpreted in arbitral 
proceedings. The argument raised by Spain in the case indicates that Spain had not 
envisaged the application of the MFN provision to dispute settlement provisions and 
yet the tribunal came to such a conclusion. Other ICSID tribunals after the Maffezeni 
case dealing with the relationship between MFN clauses and dispute settlement 
mechanisms seem to have followed the same rationale.81 The UK BIT clearly 
indicates that the provision applies to all aspects including the dispute settlement 
provisions. Despite the Germany and Italy BITs listing a few exceptions to the 
application of the provision, all three of the remaining BITs are silent on the question 
of applicability to dispute settlement mechanisms. This is an indication that Kenya‟s 
BITs with the exclusion of the UK BIT are not clear on whether the MFN provision 
applies to dispute settlement provisions or not. 
 With regard to the dispute settlement provisions in Kenya‟s BITs, the UK BIT 
provides a three-month waiting period for investor-state disputes while the other 
three BITs provide for a six-month waiting period. In the event that investors from 
other countries that have longer waiting periods decide to benefit from other Kenyan 
BITs, the MFN provisions in these BITs might be extended to the dispute settlement 
provisions that may not have been Kenya‟s intention when signing the treaty. 
However, it is also important to note that the Maffezini decision and others that 
followed a similar approach did not go unopposed. Citing one example of Tecmed v 
Mexico, the tribunal declared that it should be presumed that the parties to a treaty 
specifically negotiated for the dispute settlement provisions and thus the parties 
would not have entered into the agreement had it not been for those provisions.82 
Ukpe indicates that ICSID jurisprudence on the applicability of the MFN provision on 
dispute settlement provisions has been anything but uniform in both its results and 
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analytical methodology.83 Normally tribunals tilt towards interpreting the intention of 
the parties in accordance with the general rule in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Laws of Treaties.84 Article 31 (1) of the Convention provides that a treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.85 In 
interpreting this provision, ICSID tribunals have returned conflicting judgments.86 
Parker concludes that more than ten years after the Maffezini decision, it is safe to 
say there is no longer a threat of uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the MFN 
provision but that in fact, the uncertainty already exists.87 This further indicates that 
any tribunal may interpret the MFN provision broadly if the phrasing of the parties to 
the treaty does not clearly indicate how the provision is to be interpreted. 
2.2.5 Investor state dispute provision 
Another issue potentially faced by Kenya regarding its BITs relates to the investor-
state dispute clause. This provision is found in all four of Kenya‟s BITs that were 
signed prior to the 21st century. The provision allows investors to leapfrog domestic 
courts and sue governments in international arbitration tribunals if there has been an 
alleged breach of treaty protections.88 In other words, the provision relocates 
decision-making power outside the country and into international panels whose 
determinations can have major implications on domestic policies.89 This has already 
been evident in a number of cases including the challenge against Australia from 
Philip Morris International, the tobacco group, in relation to plain packaging rules for 
cigarettes.90 Germany is also being challenged by Vattenfall, the Swedish energy 
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company, over the decision to phase out nuclear power following the Fukushima 
nuclear disaster in Japan.91 Not only will this prove costly for the governments 
involved but it will also have a bearing on the legitimate policy initiatives of these 
countries. Kenya may find itself in a similar position since all of its BITs make 
provision for the same clause. 
The risk of the investor-state dispute provision in Kenya‟s BITs is further 
compounded by the fact that it is at the request of the foreign investor that the parties 
go to arbitration in three of the four BITs signed by Kenya prior to the 21st century 
with the exclusion of the UK BIT. Article 8 (3) of the UK BIT provides that the 
decision to choose between arbitration or conciliation lies with the foreign investor. 
This provision is also found in Article 9 (3) of the Italy BIT. Not only does this affect 
the sovereignty of a state but it also undermines the judiciary system of the country. 
The Australian government in its 2004 FTA with the United States refused to 
countenance investor-state dispute settlement in its BIT and further made a policy 
excluding investor-state rules from trade agreements permanent.92 The rationale for 
deciding against the inclusion of the provision was based on the reasoning that 
Australian courts are more than capable of enforcing domestic laws.93 This however, 
was later changed by the newly elected Australian government that has included the 
provision in the Australia-Korea BIT.94 Regardless of the new Australian 
government‟s position on the investor-state dispute clause, the arbitration 
proceedings regarding dispute resolution mechanism has been argued to be biased 
towards foreign investors or powerful states.95 Article 11 (3) of the Germany BIT 
stresses that the award given under such arbitrations shall be binding and shall not 
be subject to any appeal or remedy other than those provided for in the said 
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convention. This highlights a great risk for the Kenyan government in the event that 
an investor sues the government at international arbitrations where there will be no 
room for appeal against decisions that the government may feel have been unjustly 
awarded. 
2.2.6 Reference to national laws 
Kenya‟s BITs contain provisions that specifically make reference to the applicability 
of national laws in matters regarding the contracting parties‟ rights and obligations. 
This is in addition to the scope that is afforded to foreign investment treaties that 
applies to essentially all economic activities of foreign investors by broad definitions 
of the term investment found in practically all of the treaties as indicated above.96 
This means that BIT provisions potentially affect nearly every aspect of the host 
states legal system.97 Provisions in Kenya‟s BITs that refer to national legislation 
include Article 2 (4), Article 3 (2) and Article 12 of the Italian BIT, Article 3 of the 
Netherlands BIT, Article 8 of the Germany BIT and Article 11 of the UK BIT. As is 
indicated in these provisions, where there is evidence that the domestic legislation 
favours investors more than the treaty does, the domestic legislation will apply. This 
may present a potential legal problem for Kenya in the event that Kenya decides to 
reform their laws that seem to favour foreign investors. 
With this in mind, it is important to note that most investors base their decision to 
invest in a particular country on a number of factors that include the legal and 
regulatory framework of the country they seek to invest in.98 A reform of a country‟s 
legislation that favoured foreign investors at the time that the investment was made 
to a situation where the legislation no longer favours foreign investors may affect the 
business of the foreign investor if their decision to invest in the country was based on 
such laws. In the Czech Republic, investors are challenging the 2011 amendments 
that placed a levy on electricity generated from solar power plants.99 The investors 
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are arguing that these amendments undercut the viability of their investments and 
modified the incentive regime that had been originally put in place to stimulate the 
use of renewable energy in the country.100 Dolzer indicates that in such situations, 
the investor is entitled, in principle, to rely on the legal rights granted to him by the 
law as it stands at the time of the investment.101 This highlights the potential of a 
legal problem for Kenya since it indicates that it may be difficult to change any laws 
that favour investors without provoking a legal dispute with investors who may feel 
as though their rights to certain entitlements are being violated. Investors generally 
feel threatened when governments promote policy changes that could potentially 
have an adverse effect on their rights and legitimate expectations.102 
The above analysis of Kenya‟s BITs indicates that there are potential problems in the 
interpretation of the treaties and that key provisions were omitted from these 
agreements.  Another important aspect that has been highlighted by the analysis 
thus far is that the BITs have a bearing on Kenya‟s domestic legislative framework or 
its policies in some way. There have been concerns that the effect of foreign 
investment treaties on the domestic legal system may be so severe as to be 
unacceptable.103 This calls for the need for an analysis of the Kenyan BITs in the 
context of Kenya‟s legislative framework or policies. 
2.3 Analysis of Kenya‟s BITs in the context of the domestic legislative framework or 
policies 
Kenya‟s BITs make specific reference to the applicability of the parties‟ national laws 
to the investments made by the respective countries. Kenya has laws and 
regulations that govern FDI or have an impact on foreign investors‟ decision to invest 
in Kenya. Such laws will have a direct impact on investments made in the country 
regardless of the fact that a BIT exists with the investor‟s country or not. Examples of 
such laws include, the Constitution of Kenya (2010), the Companies Act Chapter 486 
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(revised 2012), the Private Public Partnership Act No. 15 of 2013 and the Foreign 
Investment Protection Act Chapter 518 (revised 2012) to mention a few. A further 
analysis of Kenya‟s BITs in the context of Kenya‟s constitution, Kenya‟s mining 
legislative framework and policies together with that of Kenya‟s tax regime shall be 
carried out in order to determine whether there exists a potential for conflicts with 
Kenya‟s BITs. 
2.3.1 Kenya‟s mining legislation or policies 
In September of 2013, the Kenyan mining secretary announced that Kenya had 
revoked 42 mining licenses that had been granted between 14 January and 15 May 
2013.104 The Secretary indicated that the rationale for such a measure was based on 
the fact that the licenses had been improperly awarded by the previous 
administration during the transitional period between governments earlier that 
year.105 In addition to this, it was also announced that royalties on minerals were to 
be increased, and the exploration drilling charges were also to be increased by more 
than tenfold.106 The provisions regarding the application of licenses and the financial 
provisions were included in a new Bill that is set to replace the Mining Act of 1940 
(Chapter 306 of the Laws of Kenya).107 
The above-mentioned revocation of licenses and the drastic increases in royalties 
and drilling charges may have impacted foreign investors by creating an adverse 
business environment. Article 5 (1) of the Italian BIT states that  
„the investment to which this agreement relates shall not be subject to any 
measure which might limit the right of ownership, possession, control or 
enjoyment of the investments, permanently or temporarily, save where 
specifically provided by current, national or local, legislation or regulations and 
orders handed down by courts or tribunals having jurisdiction.‟  
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The new Mining Bill highlighted above is still set to become an Act and so it does not 
warrant an exception under Article 5 (1) highlighted above since the exception 
embodied in the BIT provision refers to current legislation existing in Kenya and not 
future legislation. The Bill if passed into an Act will be a violation of the said provision 
since it limits the rights of ownership, possession, control or enjoyment of foreign 
investor‟s investment in Kenya‟s mining industry. This would thereby oblige the 
Kenyan government to compensate Italian foreign investors.  
In an article by King and Spalding, the authors indicate the same view by highlighting 
that, foreign mining companies that had investments in Kenya, whose mining 
licenses were cancelled, whose revenues decreased as a result of these new drilling 
charges and/or were affected by the royalty schemes may be able to bring 
compensation claims against the Kenyan government.108 All these potential 
problems are a result of Kenya‟s move towards implementing reforms in the legal 
framework of their mining sector. Indonesia is facing a billion-dollar lawsuit from UK-
listed Churchill Mining under the terms of one such treaty, in addition to several 
unrelated threats of costly litigation from international companies unhappy with a 
new mining law.109This highlights a need for Kenya to review its BITs that they 
signed prior to the 21st century in the context of its domestic legislative framework 
since they are moving towards making reforms in their legislation that may result in 
violations of their BIT obligations.  
2.3.2 Kenya‟s tax policies and measures affecting Kenya‟s constitution 
Another area in which Kenya‟s legislative framework or domestic policy may affect its 
current BITs may be found in Kenya‟s tax laws in relation to foreign investments. The 
government of Kenya provides a wide range of tax incentives to businesses to attract 
greater levels of FDI into the country.110 The Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) 
defines tax incentives as a provision that grants any person or activity favourable 
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conditions that deviate from the normal provisions of the tax legislation.111 Often, 
these investment incentives are provided to companies operating in Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs).112 EPZs are a secured territory where a special tax 
regime and other conditions are applied to companies operating therein.113 The 
majority of the EPZ investors (61 percent) are foreign companies primarily from 
China, Britain, the US, the Netherlands, Qatar, Taiwan and India, some of which 
have BITs with Kenya.114 
The EPZs are governed by the Export Processing Zone Act (EPZA) Chapter 157 of 
1990. This Act makes provision for benefits to EPZ Enterprises, which among other 
provisions include several tax exemptions.115 Some of the fiscal incentives that are 
offered to investors include a ten year corporate tax holiday and 25 percent tax rate 
on profits thereafter (except for commercial activities), ten year withholding tax 
holiday, duty and value added tax (VAT) exemption on inputs and stamp duty 
exemption.116 Some analysts are of the opinion that these tax incentives are leading 
to very large revenue losses and are not needed to attract FDI.117 Dr Kituyi, the 
UNCTAD Secretary General and Former Trade Minister of Kenya, delivered a report 
expressing the same view by stating that the idea that foreign companies should not 
be taxed in countries where they are making profits is misleading.118 He further 
elaborated that there was need to strengthen the voice of the ordinary taxpayer who 
suffers from such tax exemptions on foreign investors.119 These remarks were in line 
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with Section 201 (b) (1) of the Constitution of Kenya, which encourages the burden 
of taxation to be shared equally. 
 In January 2011, the government of Kenya committed itself in its „letter of intent‟ to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to „rationalising existing tax incentives, 
expanding the income base and removing tax exemptions as envisaged in the 
constitution‟.120 This further emphasises how the constitutional provision on the 
burden of taxation is being violated by the continued existence of tax incentives 
available to foreign investors. This may have an effect on the Kenyan government in 
the event that local investors or ordinary taxpayers challenge the tax regime based 
on the constitution. 
In Antoine Goetz and Others v The Republic of Burundi, a Belgian investor filed a 
case at ICSID based on a BIT against Burundi arguing that the withdrawal of a free 
zone certificate granting a series of tax and customs exemptions to their investment 
in a precious metals business amounted to expropriation.121 In another case Spentex 
Netherlands B. V v the Republic of Uzbekistan, the investor is complaining about the 
revocation of an investment incentive (a VAT subsidy).122 Both of these cases 
highlight a potential problem that Kenya may experience in the event that it decides 
to alter its tax legislation. Investors are protected against changes in the host states 
policy that arbitrators may characterise as regulatory expropriation on the basis that 
a law or another measure has reduced the value of an investment.123 As such, 
Kenya may not easily alter its tax regime without risking arbitration from foreign 
investors. Kenya is therefore restricted from implementing changes in its laws based 
on its BIT commitments. 
All four of Kenya‟s BITs that are being analysed in this chapter, clearly state in the 
preamble that the treaties are meant for the encouragement or promotion and 
protection of investments. Tax incentives may be viewed as a means of promoting or 
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encouraging investments. However, with the losses that Kenya is said to be suffering 
from these incentives as was highlighted above, there is need for Kenya to take 
measures to curb such losses and to align its tax incentives provided to foreigners 
with its constitution. This would involve reforms in Kenya‟s tax legislation that may 
have adverse effects on investors‟ business by say affecting profits or the returns 
from the investments that may provoke legal action against the Kenyan government. 
As was indicated above, countries that made the decision to invest in Kenya 
because of these tax incentives may be severely affected by a change in tax laws, 
which may lead those investors to sue the Kenyan government. It is also important to 
note that, issues relating to investment incentives schemes were also listed among 
the major disputes that were brought to ICSID.124 
To add to the issue of tax incentives, there are many disadvantages that have been 
associated with them. For example, tax incentives are said to be prone to abuse 
when the incentive is exhausted, and the promoters of the business fraudulently 
wind it down and simultaneously establish another entity to be accorded the same 
tax incentives.125 Such existing enterprises will disguise themselves as new 
enterprises through nominal reorganisation resulting in high revenue costs on the 
economy.126 Some EPZ companies have also been criticised for allegedly setting up 
operations to benefit from the 10-year tax holiday, only to close shop at the expiry of 
the grace period.127 More stringent regulatory measures need to be put in place in 
order to avoid such situations. In the event that such measures affect the foreign 
investments in the country, there would be potential legal problems for the Kenyan 
government. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined potential legal problems that may arise from Kenya‟s BITs 
and how such problems might pose legal challenges for the country. The analysis 
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was conducted based on the legal interpretation of the BITs and an interpretation in 
the context of Kenya‟s domestic legislative framework. What the analysis revealed 
was that some of Kenya‟s BITs omitted to define important terms and in the BITs 
where the terms were defined, the definitions could be subject to very broad 
interpretations thereby exposing the Kenyan government to unforeseen litigation. 
The analysis also revealed that there is not enough detail on what the fair and 
equitable treatment provision entails or enough detail to limit the scope of application 
of the most favoured nation provision that may result in undesirable interpretations 
for the Kenyan government. Various cases were examined, to show how the BIT 
provisions that were highlighted could affect Kenya, and these cases pointed out the 
uncertainties that plague the dispute settlement forums that are mainly used in 
investment disputes. Kenya‟s BITs were also shown to be placing a limit on the 
Kenyan government‟s policy space in matters regarding providing assistance to its 
own nationals due to the national treatment provision and on promulgating new 
legislation that affects investors‟ investments.   
The following chapter will describe South Africa‟s experience with BITs entered into 
prior to the 21st century. It will describe the factors that prompted South Africa to 
review its BITs, the manner in which South Africa reviewed its BITs and the 
measures that South Africa took after review with particular focus on how South 
Africa handled some of the concerns highlighted in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3: South Africa‟s experience with BITs 
3.0 Introduction 
The chapter will focus on the BITs that were signed prior to the 21st century by South 
Africa. South Africa signed a total of 23 BITs during this period that came into 
force.128 Of these 23 BITs, one of them was signed by South Africa‟s former colonial 
government with Paraguay in 1974 and will not be considered in this chapter. Of the 
22 BITs that came into force that were signed by the post-Apartheid South African 
government, six of them have been terminated.129 This chapter will indicate the 
factors that prompted South Africa to review its BITs, the manner in which South 
Africa reviewed its BITs and the measures that South Africa took after review. The 
focus of this chapter will not only be limited to the BITs that were terminated but on 
the review mechanism in general, the factors that prompted the review and the 
measures that South Africa took in light of that process. In so doing, this chapter will 
indicate the legal problems that South Africa unravelled from its BITs through the 
review process and the measures that it adopted after review. 
3.1 Brief History of South Africa‟s BIT system 
The first BIT that South Africa signed was with the UK in 1994. Although this BIT was 
signed by the new South African government in 1994, it was presented to the 
outgoing government in 1992/93.130 The outgoing South African government officials 
simply accepted the draft model BIT without any negotiations when it was presented 
to them in 1992/93.131 The rationale for such a decision can be attributed to a lot of 
factors including the fact that the South African government officials believed that the 
BIT did not conflict with any South African law and neither did it contain any 
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obligations for the South African government.132 It is important to note that this 
agreement and others alike entered into prior to the 21st century were negotiated 
without the presence of a lawyer or hardly any relevant government stakeholder.133 
Based on the beliefs that the South African government officials had at that time, the 
UK model BIT was adopted by South Africa as the basis for concluding 46 additional 
BITs (a figure inclusive of the BITs that did not come into force).134 Most of these 
BITs were signed with a group of European countries that had traditionally been the 
largest source of FDI in South Africa.135 The UK draft model BIT was based on a 
standard Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
model.136 The main features of this model were that, „it stipulated that foreign 
investors and their investments had to be treated fairly and equitably, there should 
be no discrimination or expropriation, contracts should be upheld, there should be no 
capital restrictions, and disputes could be adjudicated through international investor-
state arbitration.‟137 
It is the opinion of Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Johnson that the OECD model 
provided vague, potentially strong protections for foreign investors, with little explicit 
consideration of the potential impacts on host states‟ rights, investors‟ obligations, or 
the broader relationship between investment and sustainable development.138 At the 
time that this BIT was signed, South Africa was emerging from colonial rule and was 
yet to fully develop its strategy for negotiating BITs. In general terms, the OECD 
model took advantage of this situation by ensuring that capital exporters‟ 
investments benefited the most from the agreements at the expense of the capital 
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importing country, South Africa in this case. To date, six of the BITs that South Africa 
signed using this model template prior to the 21st century have been terminated after 
a three-year review process of the BITs (hereinafter referred to as the review) that 
was initiated by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) from 2007 -2010.139 
3.2 Factors that prompted South Africa‟s BIT review 
To provide a better understanding of what prompted South Africa to review its BITs, 
it is important to begin by providing a brief history of South Africa that led the country 
to sign its first BIT, the general perspective regarding BITs at the time and the 
manner in which South Africa entered into its BITs. As was mentioned in the 
previous section, South Africa entered its first BIT in 1994 soon after attaining its 
independence. Prior to that, South Africa had no history of negotiating BITs and the 
risks posed by such treaties were not fully appreciated at that time.140 South Africa 
had been undergoing a combination of international sanctions and tight capital 
controls and, as a result, the country received almost no FDI inflows during 
apartheid.141 After independence, South Africa had to reverse the disastrous 
economic management under apartheid and attracting foreign investment was an 
important component of the economic strategy.142 Nelson Mandela was quoted 
stating that the rates of economic growth could not be achieved without important 
inflows of foreign capital.143 He further elaborated that they were determined to 
create the necessary climate that the foreign investor would find attractive.144 In 
working towards achieving this, South Africa had to signal to the world and foreign 
investors in particular, that it was a safe investment destination.145 At that time, the 
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best way to make a firm signal of such intent was though entering into BITs.146 Rajan 
indicates that India entered into its first BIT in 1994 with the UK (the same year in 
which South Africa ratified its first BIT) and at that time there was a pervasive one-
dimensional approach towards BITs that these treaties were instruments aimed at 
attracting and protecting FDI alone.147 Under such assumptions, like many other 
countries during that time, South Africa hastily entered into BITs as a way of 
attracting FDI. 
In addition to reversing the disastrous economic management that was under 
apartheid, South Africa also had to begin rectifying deeply entrenched racial 
inequalities that existed prior to South Africa‟s independence.148 The new South 
African government had inherited a society that was among the most unequal in the 
world, where the vast majority of black South Africans had been excluded from 
meaningful economic activity under apartheid.149 As part of a set of initiatives to 
redress this inheritance and to meet the government‟s constitutional obligation to 
create a more open and equitable society based on human rights, black economic 
empowerment (BEE) programmes were initiated.150 These programmes were not in 
line with South Africa‟s BIT commitments and upon being faced with legal action 
under the auspices of the ICSID Additional Facility, South Africa initiated a review 
process of its BITs. The details of the legal issues that arose from the BEE 
programmes shall be explained below. 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resource Development Act of 2004 (MPRDA) is an 
example of the BEE policies that the South African government implemented. The 
MPRDA was introduced among other reasons to bring South Africa‟s mineral rights 
regime in line with the provisions of its constitution and to provide for the state to fulfil 
its constitutional role as the custodian of the nation‟s mineral wealth on behalf of the 
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people of South Africa.151 In 2007, a group of Italian investors who owned granite 
production companies in South Africa were opposed to the provisions of the MPRDA 
and South Africa‟s BEE agenda.152 The Embassy of Italy in Pretoria submitted an 
„Aide Memoire‟ to the government of South Africa setting forth Italy‟s view on the 
BEE legislation and signalling the Italian government‟s support for the 
aforementioned Italian investors.153 Italy warned that the Act might produce a breach 
of the Italy-South Africa BIT.154 In particular, Italy warned that the Act‟s social 
upliftment objectives and its preferencing of ownership by historically disadvantaged 
South Africans could be deemed breaches of just, fair and non-discriminatory 
treatment of Italian nationals.155 Following these diplomatic interventions, the Italian 
investors‟ initiated an arbitration claim against South Africa in terms of the rules of 
the ICSID Additional Facility in a case that is referred to as the Forestis case.156 The 
South African government defended the MPRDA by arguing that it protected existing 
mineral rights and allowed for their uninterrupted use so long as companies also met 
the government‟s wider transformational obligations in the same accepted 
combination.157 This was a clear indication of how the South African government was 
trying to balance its obligations to its foreign investors with the obligations it had to 
the South African citizens who had been unfairly treated during the apartheid era. 
Eventually, the case was settled outside the arbitration tribunal following an 
agreement between the parties whereby South Africa granted the investors new 
mining rights and the investors requested to discontinue the arbitration 
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proceedings.158 Consequently, in 2010 the tribunal dismissed the investors‟ claims 
and ordered them to pay part of South Africa‟s arbitration costs.159 
Sheffer is of the opinion that the above-mentioned Foresti case could have ended 
with much weightier consequences for South Africa.160 The basis of her opinion is 
the fact that similar cases regarding host-state measures had resulted in tribunals 
ruling in favour of the foreign investor.161 Poulsen shared a similar view of the 
consequences of this case having dire effects on the South African government by 
indicating that, had the claim by the Italian investors been successful, it had the 
potential to open the floodgates to similar claims questioning the redistributive efforts 
of the post-apartheid regime.162 As a result of this incident, South Africa realised how 
much BITs were encroaching on its domestic policy space and given the importance 
of South Africa‟s social upliftment objectives to the country, the South African 
government had to rethink its position regarding its BITs. 
The Foresti case was not the only indication to South Africa that the BITs 
encroached on the country‟s policy space. The first known instance of investors 
using BITs to promote their interests, vis-à-vis the South African government, was in 
2001.163 During this period South Africa‟s policy makers suggested a ban on foreign 
ownership and forced disinvestment among the approximately 5000 private security 
firms in the country, one of the largest security industries in the world when seen 
relative to the size of the South African economy.164 Foreign investors objected 
fiercely to these suggestions and the British government informed South Africa that 
any such measure would breach the BIT between the two countries, which would 
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result in legal recourse for the British citizens.165 Eventually, the foreign-owned 
security companies won the argument.166 Kicking out firms who brought in close to 
two billion Rands a year turned out to be too costly an endeavour for the South 
African government even without a BIT claim.167 From this experience, South Africa 
began to realise the limitation that was placed on the government‟s policy space by 
its commitment to BITs. This incident, together with that of the Foresti case gave 
South Africa a practical experience of the effect that BITs have on domestic policy 
space and as such contributed to the country rethinking its position regarding BITs. 
In 2004, prior to the Foresti case, South Africa was called upon to respond to 
investor claims based on BIT provisions. A Swiss investor who had acquired a game 
reserve that was later subject to poaching, vandalism and theft initiated the claims.168 
The investor alleged, among many other allegations, that the government had failed 
in its treaty obligations to provide protection and security.169 The tribunal found South 
Africa in breach of its obligations to provide full protection and security and it 
awarded the investor almost seven million Rands in compensation, which the South 
African government paid a year later.170 Having suffered a non-trivial loss in 
compensating the investor, South Africa began to realise the legal and practical 
implications of its BITs and the harsh consequences of failure to adhere to BIT 
provisions. As such, South Africa had to evaluate the risks and benefits from such 
treaties and come up with measures that would avoid facing such similar cases in 
the future. 
Another situation that triggered the review of South Africa‟s BITs was the 
development that South Africa was undergoing from the time of signing its first BIT to 
the modern day South Africa. South Africa‟s first model BIT, which was the basis for 
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concluding all subsequent BITs, was negotiated or entered into before the adoption 
of the new constitution in 1996.171 This constitution provides robust safeguards to 
protect private property and investments in the country.172 Examples of such 
safeguards are evident in section 25 of the Constitution of South Africa that provides 
protection for property rights and section 9 that prohibits discrimination on various 
grounds. The horizontal protection established in this constitution and South Africa‟s 
legislation is complemented by sectoral regimes that cover among other things 
finance, banking, communication and mining.173 Moreover, apart from the 
developments in South Africa‟s legislation, the country developed to rank amongst 
the most open jurisdictions in the world, providing investment protection through 
domestic law that is consistent with the highest international standards.174 Such 
developments countered the use of BITs in protecting foreign investments in South 
Africa and with such developments, South Africa had to rethink its position regarding 
the use of BITs. 
To add to how South Africa‟s development contributed to the review process, 
Gordon and Pohl indicate that each investment treaty reflects a specific approach to 
protecting covered investors and managing legal risks for treaty partners.175 As the 
distinction between capital exporting and capital importing countries continues to 
fade, many countries would be classified as being in both categories and countries‟ 
perceived self-interests in relation to investment treaties may have evolved.176 
Investment protection may gain in importance for countries with emerging capital 
export activities while management of legal risks may assume greater importance to 
countries that have traditionally been capital exporters but now receive significant 
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capital inflows.177 Johnson elaborates on this same view by indicating that countries 
need specific BIT provisions depending on their progressive stages of 
development.178 These provisions would help the countries keep up with their 
economic development agenda.179 As Randal points out, South Africa developed 
from a capital importing country to a capital exporting country with the levels of 
domestic investment increasing180 and as such, the provisions in South Africa‟s 
earlier BITs no longer served important needs for the South African government. 
South Africa‟s focus had shifted from not only protecting foreign investments but also 
protecting and promoting its local investors and equating the conditions in which 
investors were treated among other factors. Such developments further necessitated 
that South Africa rethink its position regarding BITs. 
The international trend regarding BITs also had a bearing on South Africa‟s decision 
to review its BITs. De Gama points out that South Africa observed the fractious 
debate in the OECD over a multilateral investment agreement.181 From this, South 
Africa gained insight into the issues that other countries were experiencing with their 
BITs. South Africa also participated in the discussions in the WTO that sought to 
include investment as one of the Singapore Issues in the Doha Round 
negotiations.182 South Africa‟s involvement in both these events provided an 
awakening regarding issues related to BITs from other countries experiences. The 
rise in international investment arbitrations that followed the financial crisis of 2001 
further contributed to South Africa‟s knowledge of the risks that were associated with 
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the BITs.183 This, in addition to South Africa‟s own experiences as being respondent 
to ICSID cases, all contributed to South Africa rethinking its position regarding BITs. 
In their proposition for BIT renegotiation, Haftel and Thompson indicate that BIT 
negotiators lacked information when they consummated the original agreements and 
that governments were able to update over time, meaning to say that learning took 
place.184 This proposition seems true for the South African government that learnt 
not only from its personal experience of being a respondent to BIT claims but also 
from the knowledge it acquired from arbitrations between other countries. The 
UNCTAD Issue Notes indicate that since the year 2000, there has been a marked 
increase in arbitrations under BITs worldwide.185 The awards in these cases have 
shown evidence of inconsistencies.186 There are divergent legal interpretations of 
identical or similar provisions and differences in the assessment of the merits of the 
cases involving the same facts.187 To further complicate this fragmented system is 
the fact that there is the absence of an appellate process which often falls short of 
meeting the standards of legal correctness and consistency.188 Under Article 52 (4) 
of the ICSID Additional Facility rules, awards given shall be final and binding on the 
parties. The growing number of cases and the inconsistencies mentioned, which are 
not subject to appeal, have led to uncertainty about the meaning of treaty obligations 
leading to the unpredictability of how the treaties are interpreted.189 All this became 
apparent to South Africa after it had entered into its BITs. Being a signatory to such 
treaty provisions became a cause of concern for the South African government 
contributing to the decision by South Africa to review its BIT policy framework. 
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Moreover, South Africa also learnt that the growing number of cases was challenging 
government measures such as changes to the domestic regulatory framework, the 
tax regime, public tenders, public health, the environment and measures that were 
aimed to address the financial crisis bailouts and withdrawal of subsidies.190 In these 
cases, 75 percent of the awards were in favour of foreign investors and significantly 
high arbitration costs were involved with such disputes (more than US$ 8 million on 
average per case).191 Such situations are undesirable for any country with BITs and 
too harsh to be ignored. To worsen the situation, the arbitration process includes 
three individuals that are appointed on an ad hoc basis who access acts of states, in 
particular, sensitive public policy issues that undermine countries‟ domestic legal 
systems.192 Such observations on international trends regarding BITs also 
contributed to South Africa‟s decision to review its BITs. 
A public statement by South Africa‟s trade minister reveals that the government 
justified their decisions to update their investment protection regime as being 
consistent with global trends.193 Such trends include the fact that Latin American 
governments have come out strongly in opposition to prevailing norms resulting in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela denouncing the ICSID while India and Mexico have 
both refused to be party to the ICSID.194 Brazil has not ratified any of its BITs.195 
There has also been a considerable re-writing of BITs in countries such as the 
United States and Canada to mention a few.196 The European Union and India are 
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also in the process of reviewing their BITs.197 Gordon and Pohl indicate that in a 
sample of countries that had brought their IIAs in force since 1959, at least 170 
treaties or at least nine percent of the sub-sample had been amended, 
complemented after signature by protocols, replaced, denounced or ended by 
mutual agreement.198 New approaches to investment treaties are emerging to 
mitigate risks of earlier agreements through more precise drafting of provisions.199 
As such, South Africa had to keep up with global trends regarding BITs. 
There are also other factors that contributed to South Africa reviewing its BITs that 
shall be briefly indicated. Mossallam points out that at the time the decision to review 
was made, most of South Africa‟s BITs were about to reach their renewal phases.200 
This required South Africa to take immediate action in revising their BITs. South 
Africa was also realising that it was getting FDI from countries that did not have BITs 
with South Africa, which also prompted South Africa to rethink its position regarding 
BITs. Williams also points out that he had requested that the South African 
government consider revisiting its BITs after he had investigated what South Africa 
had signed up for in its earlier BIT commitments.201 William‟s request was however 
not taken up immediately due to the lack of coordination of South Africa‟s BIT policy 
at the time, that saw continued negotiations of BITs despite the imposition of a 
moratorium.202 All these factors indicated above contributed to the decision to review 
South Africa‟s BITs.  
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3.3 South Africa‟s BIT review process 
South Africa‟s BIT review process does not differ substantially from other nations 
that have undertaken BIT reviews. Countries that have reviewed their treaties such 
as the United States, Canada, Norway, Sweden had, among other factors, targeted 
the review mechanism to specific aspects. The United States, for example, revisited 
its model BIT with emphasis on three aspects; the dispute settlement provisions, the 
state-owned enterprises and financial services issues.203 South Africa‟s review 
process was however targeted at assessing the role of foreign investment in the 
country, the levels of protection afforded to investment, and the risks and benefits of 
BITs.204 In addition, as part of the review process, the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) was mandated to review and strengthen the country‟s 
investment regime in order to open the country up to FDI, while still maintaining the 
sovereign right to pursue policy objectives.205 
With the aforementioned objectives and mandates in mind, the DTI invited the 
participation of various stakeholders that included businesses, labour, government, 
local and international institutions.206 This was also akin to the method that was used 
by the United States in its review process since it also considered the views of an 
advisory committee composed of a diverse group of investment experts, 
representing the businesses, academia, labour, environmental NGOs and legal 
professions.207 The participation of various local stakeholders in South Africa was 
achieved through detailed interviews at the management level with the DTI.208 South 
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Africa went further by conducting meetings regarding the review outside of South 
Africa at UNCTAD and the South Centre.209 
The BIT review process included three drafts, the first of which was an initial policy 
document based on research collected through interviewing the bilateral units in the 
international trade division who directly worked with BITs.210 This also included an 
internal government workshop that brought policy makers together to discuss the 
results of the review and receive feedback on it.211 The second draft of the policy 
paper encompassed the feedback from the first draft and was published online as 
well as in the newspapers for public comment.212 The feedback received from this 
draft was integrated into the third draft that was sent to the cabinet.213 It is important 
to note that in 2010, at the completion of the review process, the South African 
government published the key findings of the review and the measures South Africa 
was planning to take as determined by the cabinet.214 
The review process that South Africa undertook will be assessed further in this 
chapter with specific focus centered on the target areas that South Africa considered 
when it reviewed its BITs. Although the factors that were alluded to earlier include 
the role of foreign investment in South Africa, the level of protection afforded to 
investment and the risks and benefits of BITs, most of the focus shall be centered on 
the risks that were inherent in South Africa‟s BITs that were evident during the 
review process. However, brief highlights on the factors that helped conclude the 
role of foreign investment in the context of BITs and the evaluation of protection that 
was afforded to investment in South Africa by South Africa‟s BITs shall also be 
indicated so as to provide a better understanding of the outcome of the review 
process.  
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3.3.1 Risks inherent in South Africa‟s BITs 
The risks that were inherent in South Africa‟s BITs were evident from an analysis 
that was conducted on the individual BITs with reference to the prevailing BIT 
arbitrations, the current trends regarding BITs and how other countries were treating 
their BITs. The analysis was also carried out with the objective of establishing how 
the BITs co-existed with South Africa‟s domestic legislative framework. South Africa 
analysed its BITs based on 11 standard clauses that are found in South Africa‟s 
BITs.215 This chapter will focus on a few of these standard clauses with regards to 
their interpretation and in the context of South Africa‟s domestic legislative 
framework. 
3.3.1.1 Individual analysis based on interpretation of the provisions 
South Africa‟s BITs provide for a definition of terms. Some of the terms are broadly 
defined in the treaties. The term investment for example is defined in Article 1 of the 
BITs that South Africa signed with Germany, Netherlands, UK and Korea, to mention 
a few as „any kind of asset invested by the investor of one contracting party‟. The 
definition in some of these treaties goes further to highlight certain assets considered 
as an investment and indicating that the list was not exclusive. As was explained in 
section 2.2 of the previous chapter, such a definition would lead to an interpretation 
that would include assets that are not acquired for economic benefits or business 
purposes. Such interpretations could lead to claims from property that South Africa 
had not considered as investments in its treaties. This thereby served as an 
indication that such definitions had to be narrowed down in order to cover only the 
aspects desired by the South African government. 
The fair and equitable treatment provision in South Africa‟s BITs was also examined 
and concluded as being too broad and vague.216 It was also highlighted during the 
review how such a provision had been subject to inconsistent interpretations by 
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international arbitration tribunals in other disputes.217 The fair and equitable provision 
is phrased similarly in most of South Africa‟s BITs and provides that, 
„investments of nationals or companies of each contracting party shall at all 
times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection 
and security in the territory of the other contracting party.‟218 
The analysis revealed that such a provision potentially allows foreign investors to 
seek compensation if the conditions under which their investment was made 
(including any applicable domestic regulations) are later changed in ways 
detrimental to the investor‟s interests.219 This would result in potential legal disputes 
at international tribunals that would be costly for the South African Government, as 
was evident in the Foresti case, and that of the Swiss investor indicated above. 
Another risk that was indicated in South Africa‟s review process was found in the 
investor-state arbitration clause found in most of South Africa‟s BITs. As was 
explained in the previous chapter, this provision allows investors to sue states based 
on measures that the investors deem to have violated the respective BITs that would 
be protecting the investors. This indicated to the South African government that the 
provision could allow foreign investors to challenge domestic public interest laws and 
measures in front of ad hoc international arbitral tribunals if such measures were 
deemed to have violated the investors BIT rights.220 As was evident in the Foresti 
case, this would not only affect the government‟s ability to make changes to its 
domestic law for public interest but would also undermine the functions and duties of 
the legislature and the judiciary system of the country. It would also affect the 
sovereignty of the host state being sued at international tribunals. Moreover, the high 
costs of defending such challenges against the government would be unwarranted. 
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An analysis of the overall BIT structure indicated that the BITs placed all the 
obligations on the host state and awarded all the rights to the investors.221 South 
Africa was mostly a capital importing country at the conclusion of its first BITs soon 
after its independence and was obliged to promote and protect investors‟ investment, 
to treat all its investors equally, to compensate investors for any losses suffered as a 
result of wars or any such kind of mishaps, to guide against expropriations or 
nationalising investors assets and even allowing for free transfer of funds. Such 
obligations on the state would be entitlements to the foreign investors. An example of 
a BIT in which all this is highlighted is that of the South Africa-UK BIT.222 
3.3.1.2 Analysis of South Africa‟s review process in the context of its domestic 
legislative framework 
The national treatment provision that is contained in South Africa‟s BITs was 
examined in the context of South Africa‟s legislative framework. The purpose of the 
national treatment provision is to protect foreign investors from laws and regulations 
or government policy that may treat domestic investors more favourably than 
them.223 South Africa‟s BITs differ markedly in terms of their national treatment 
commitments.224 For example, the South Africa - Netherlands BIT in Article 3(2) 
provides that  
„each contracting party shall accord to such investments treatment which in 
any case shall not be less favourable than that which it accords to 
investments of its own investors or to investments of investors of any third 
State, whichever is more favourable to the investor concerned.‟  
The South Africa - Tanzania BIT however, goes further in elaborating that the 
national treatment provision  
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„shall not be construed so as to oblige one party to extend to the investors of 
the other Party the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege resulting 
from …any law or other measure the purpose of which is to promote the 
achievement of equality in its territory, or designed to protect or advance 
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in 
its territory.‟  
The phrasing of the Netherlands BIT, and others like it, does not include any 
reference to the rights of governments to accord preferential treatment to locals in 
certain circumstances.225 This directly contradicts section 9 (2) of the Constitution of 
South Africa of 2006, which provides for affirmative action measures. Such 
measures are designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination so as to promote the achievement of 
equality.226 The phrasing of the Netherlands BIT hinders the application of this 
constitutional provision since it prohibits any form of discrimination regardless of the 
basis for such a measure. 
In addition, the national treatment provisions found in South Africa‟s BITs affected 
the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (B-BBEEA). The 
preamble of the Act states that, among other factors, the Act aims to promote the 
achievement of the constitutional right to equality, increase broad-based and 
effective participation of black people in the economy and promote a higher growth 
rate, increased employment and more equitable income distribution amongst the 
South African People. The preamble also provides for the establishment of a national 
policy on broad-based black economic empowerment. The result has been the BEE 
policy that was briefly discussed earlier in this chapter that lays down the objectives 
that the government has to meet in order to achieve the purpose of the B-BBEEA.227 
Among the policy objectives include the achievement of a substantial change in the 
racial composition of ownership and management structures and in the skilled 
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occupations of existing and new enterprises.228  It became apparent during the 
review process that the provisions of this policy were problematic in that foreign-
owned firms could argue that obligations to hire a certain percentage of black 
managers over a certain period of time, or the obligation to acquire BEE equity 
partners served to discriminate against foreign-owned business on a de facto basis 
because black-owned firms would have met such obligations already.229 With this 
revelation and the experience in responding to the Foresti case, South Africa had to 
take measures to avoid the impact of responding to more cases at international 
arbitration for violating its BIT provisions through its domestic policies.  
The above mentioned result of the review with regards to preferential policies 
violating national treatment provisions also further highlighted that the government 
would also be limited in applying other preferential government policies or schemes 
such as subsidies, grants or other forms of special treatment provided to local 
cultural industries such as film or television production.230  Such treatment might be 
construed by foreign-owned enterprises as providing more favourable treatment to 
locals contrary to South Africa‟s investment treaty obligations.231 This clearly 
indicated that South Africa was limited from forming new policies that could have 
been beneficial to its country based on its commitments to the BITs that it had signed 
in the previous century. 
South Africa‟s BITs also prohibit nationalisation or expropriation of foreign 
investments. Article 4 (2) of the Germany BIT provides that 
„investments by nationals or companies of either contracting party shall not 
be expropriated, nationalised or subjected to any other measure the effects of 
which would be tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation in the territory 
of the other contracting party except for the public interest and against 
compensation.‟ 
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 From the phrasing of this article, it is evident that the provision relates to any 
measure that impacts the use of property and deprives investors of expected 
economic benefit.232 This provision and others phrased similarly in South Africa‟s 
BITs do not distinguish between expropriation and deprivation implying that 
deprivation would be tantamount to expropriation and would result in 
compensation.233 South Africa‟s constitution, however, clearly stipulates in section 25 
that deprivation would not require compensation if the measures were pursuant to 
law and not arbitrary. This indicated another problem area that was inherent in South 
Africa‟s BITs. 
 Further evidence of the undesirable consequences of phrasing the expropriation 
clause broadly as in the Germany BIT may be shown by the conclusions drawn by 
the governments of Canada and the United States. These conclusions are important 
in the discussion of South Africa‟s review process because the conclusions were 
based on a ruling that indicated that deprivation in whole or significant part would 
constitute an expropriation contrary to the treaty no matter the purpose underlying 
that deprivation.234 Canada and the United States concluded that it could be 
dangerous to leave it to arbitrators to draw the line between legitimate government 
regulation and compensable expropriations.235 These conclusions were drawn from 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 11 investment 
arbitration involving Metalclad v. Mexico.236 In this case, the arbitral tribunal ruled 
that,  
„expropriation could be defined broadly, so as to include not only literal 
seizure or destruction of property, but also covert or incidental interference 
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole 
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or significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit 
of property.‟237 
This further indicates how the South African BITs posed a risk of adverse effects 
drawn from the interpretation of the provisions that South Africa entered into.  
South Africa‟s BITs further violated the country‟s constitution in the provisions 
relating to the calculation of compensation. The measure of compensation provided 
for under the constitution of South Africa differs from and affords less protection than 
that provided under South Africa‟s BITs.238 South Africa‟s BITs use language such as 
genuine value, actual value, real value and market value, terms that are all generally 
understood to import a concept akin to market value.239 The constitution, however, 
provides for compensation to be just and equitable, reflecting on equitable balance 
between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all 
relevant circumstances.240 The public interest is expressly stated to indicate the 
nation‟s commitment to land reform and to reforms to bring about equitable access to 
all of South Africa‟s natural resources, a methodology which is more likely to provide 
compensation at less than market value.241 
Over and above the constitutional provisions that were being violated by the BITs 
that South Africa had signed, the MPRDA was also a violation of certain BIT 
provisions as the Italian investors pointed out to South Africa. The aim of the Act is to 
promote greater participation of blacks and racial equity in the South African mining 
sector through, for example, setting minimum criteria for black ownership and 
management. 242 This, for example, included the requirement for mining companies 
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to transfer 26 percent of their shares to historically disadvantaged South Africans.243 
Not only would this be regarded as a breach of the national treatment provision, but 
also that of expropriation by foreign investors.244 This thereby made it clear to the 
South African authorities that the ability of the state to regulate its domestic public 
policy objectives was under serious threat from their BIT obligations. 
3.3.2 The role of BITs in attracting foreign investment in South Africa 
Developing countries have traditionally regarded the availability of a BIT as a means 
of attracting FDI. With this view in mind, countries such as South Africa in the period 
soon after it attained its independence, signed many BITs with developed countries 
in the hopes of attracting FDI. In reviewing the role that the BITs played in attracting 
FDI, the South African government considered international reports on studies that 
were aimed at establishing the same. Such reports authored by the World Bank and 
UNCTAD, amongst others, indicated that there was no clear relationship between 
BITs and increased FDI inflows.245 The UNCTAD report clearly stated that BITs are 
relatively insignificant in determining amounts of FDI.246 The study further indicated 
that other factors such as market size and growth, exchange rate and country risks 
appeared to determine FDI more strongly.247 
The process of the review with regards to the role of BITs in attracting FDI also 
looked at examples of other countries. Brazil, for example, is considered as one of 
the largest magnets for inward FDI in Latin America and yet Brazil has not ratified 
any of the BITs that it has signed.248 In comparison, South Africa has BITs in force 
but receives no FDI from many countries with whom they have BITs.249 Large 
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investments that came into South Africa were from non-treaty partners that included 
the US, India, Malaysia and Brazil.250 
Furthermore, a study undertaken by a private consulting firm in South Africa found 
that foreign investments only ranked legal certainty as the eighth determinant in the 
decision whether to invest in South Africa or not.251 The most important determinate 
was considered to be market size.252 Williams expressed the view that when 
developed countries sign BITs, they seek only to address one determinate of FDI, 
which is legal certainty that is meant to protect the investment and not attract FDI.253 
The South African constitution that embodies provisions relating to expropriation with 
compensation, the Competition Act, the Companies Act to mention a few all indicate 
that South Africa‟s legal regime is not weak or biased against foreigners.254 The 
review, however, was concluded on the understanding that FDI had been central to 
South Africa‟s economic development but had not been attracted to the country by 
BITs.255 
3.3.3 The level of protection afforded to investment 
The level of protection afforded to investment was also examined in the review 
process of South Africa‟s BITs. In common with many other countries‟ BITs, South 
Africa‟s BITs seek to give foreign investors certain well-established protections and 
assurances in order to promote foreign investment in the economy including 
assurances as to expropriation (and compensation where it does occur), security, 
repatriation of capital and income from investments, equality of treatment with 
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domestic investors and international arbitration of disputes.256 BITs entered into by 
South Africa may have extended even greater protection for foreign-owned property 
against government interference and incursion and without benefit of any meaningful 
public debate or scrutiny of such a move.257 Woolfrey expressed the same view by 
indicating that BITs gave foreign investors greater rights and protection than 
domestic investors.258 Such favourable treatment towards foreign investors was 
indicated earlier in the discussion on the risks that were inherent in South Africa‟s 
BITs. To expand on one of the examples that was referred to earlier, South Africa‟s 
constitution makes a distinction between deprivation and expropriation while South 
Africa‟s BITs do not provide for such a distinction. This indicates greater protection 
that is provided to foreign investors while local investors were subjected to a 
narrower definition of the term. This further emphasises that foreign investors were 
given greater protection than the local investors.  
3.4 Measures implemented by South Africa after review 
South Africa published its report on the outcome of its review process of the BITs 
that it had signed together with the measures that it planned to take. This report was 
meant to draw recommendations or views from the public. After a period of 2 years 
from the day that the report was published, and based on the findings of this report, 
the South African government proceeded with its recommendations.259 The 
recommendations included five core elements which were the development of a new 
investment Act, the termination of South Africa‟s first generation BITs while offering 
partners the possibility to renegotiate, refraining from entering into BITs in the future 
unless there were compelling economic and political reasons, to develop a new 
model BIT as a basis for renegotiation and to establish an Inter-Ministerial 
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Committee (IMC) to oversee processes.260 Each of the elements shall be explained 
further below. 
The recommendation to develop a new investment Act has resulted in the drafting of 
the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill (PPIB). The PPIB is the outcome of 
extensive intra-government legal and policy consultations and is certified by South 
Africa‟s state law advisors.261 The PPIB was opened for public comment with various 
considerations taken from the views expressed by the public.262 Should Cabinet 
endorse the PPIB, it would be presented to parliament in 2015 and will eventually 
enter into force.263 The PPIB will effectively replace BITs by providing domestic 
legislation that sets out the rights and obligations of the government and of all 
investors both local and foreign.264 On the face of it, the PPIB includes the usual 
features of BITs while introducing measures that address the concerns identified by 
the DTIs review.265 Examples of provisions in the PPIB that address the concerns of 
the review include, section 6 of the PPIB which imports the concept of national 
treatment but further qualifies it from South Africa‟s BITs by reference to applicable 
legislation in like circumstances.266 Section 7 of the PPIB provides for equal 
treatment of both foreign and domestic investors.267 Section 8 narrows down the 
definition of expropriation while section 10, is an express provision empowering the 
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South African government to take measures to redress historical, social and 
economic inequalities so as to bring the PPIB in line with the objectives of the 
countries BEE policy.268 The PPIB provides for a lot more provisions that aim at 
strengthening the countries investment regime. However, the PPIB omitted the fair 
and equitable treatment provision and precluded access to international arbitration, 
which were key concerns highlighted in the outcome of the review.269 It is important 
to note that some of these provisions that have been indicated may be changed 
before the PPIB is enacted. 
The review also resulted in the recommendation to terminate first generation BITs. 
This resulted in South Africa proceeding to legally terminate its expiring BITs with 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Germany and Switzerland.270 These were the first 
treaties to be terminated by the South African government and were given priority as 
they were subject to automatic renewal clauses which would have been extended 
had they not been terminated in time.271 South Africa further served termination 
notices to 13 states that it has BITs with, most of which were close to the end of their 
respective duration and up for renewal.272 South Africa also indicated that it would 
address its BIT with China in the context of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
South Africa) grouping.273 Although South Africa has already terminated BITs, 
served notices to terminate more BITs, protection that was afforded to some of these 
investments will remain in force for 10-15 years under the so-called survival 
clause.274 
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Another recommendation from the review was to refrain from entering into BITs in 
the future unless there were compelling economic and political reasons to do so. The 
review on the role of BITs in attracting FDI indicated that South Africa does not 
receive significant inflows of FDI from many partners with whom they had BITs with 
and yet continued to receive significant investment from jurisdictions with which they 
have no BITs with.275 From these and other factors considered during the review, 
cabinet understood the relationship between BITs and FDI as ambiguous at best and 
that BITs posed a risk and limitations on the ability of the government to pursue its 
constitutional-based transformation agenda.276 As a result, it was concluded that 
South Africa should refrain from entering into such agreements since the benefits in 
attracting FDI could not be clearly ascertained.  
The fourth recommendation from the review was to develop a new model BIT as a 
basis for renegotiation. South Africa not only terminated its first generation BITs but 
also offered partners the possibility to renegotiate.277 This would be done on the 
basis of a new model BIT that would aim to reduce the risks inherent in the earlier 
generation BITs. The new model would also be aligned with national legislation, the 
constitution and developments in international investment treaty making.278 As was 
mentioned earlier, South Africa is both a capital importing and exporting country. A 
recent Southern African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) report notes that 
South Africa has become one of the top ten investors and trading partner of many 
African countries.279 With many South African companies making such extensive 
investments abroad, BITs would be needed to protect South Africa‟s investments 
abroad.280 Some South African firms have explicitly called for treaties to be put in 
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place before they consider new investments in countries such as Zimbabwe.281 This 
indicates why South Africa would still need to maintain a model BIT despite the fact 
that it is terminating its other agreements. The new model BIT would not only serve 
to renegotiate old BITs but also in concluding other BITs where necessary. 
The fifth recommendation from the review was to establish an Inter-Ministerial 
Committee (IMC) to oversee the implementation of the aforementioned measures. 
The committee would be composed of members of various departments namely DTI, 
the national treasury, the department of international relations and cooperation, the 
economic development partnership to mention a few that have varying interest in 
certain provisions of investment agreements.282 Among other responsibilities, the 
committee would guide against binding international investment agreements being 
made by a single department. The IMC has already played a crucial role in the 
drafting of the PPIB. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The review process of South Africa‟s first generation BITs was conducted with the 
objective of not only uncovering the legal interpretations of BIT provisions or how the 
BITs co-existed with South Africa‟s domestic legislation but also on the importance of 
BITs in attracting FDI in South Africa, the benefits of BITs and the level of protection 
that was afforded to investment. Being a respondent to an ICSID case prompted 
South Africa to initiate the review process among other factors. The analyses of the 
BITs that ensued in both the legal interpretation and in the context of South Africa‟s 
domestic legislative framework indicated the problem areas of South Africa‟s BITs. 
The role of FDI and the high level of protection afforded to foreign investors that was 
not proportional to that offered to local investors all contributed to the 
recommendations on how best the South African government could address the 
problems that it had regarding its BITs. Based on this review, South Africa made 
numerous recommendations regarding its outdated BITs which involved the 
development of a new investment Act, the termination of South Africa‟s first 
generation BITs, the suggestion to refrain from entering into more BITs unless there 
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were compelling economic and political reasons to do so, the development of a new 
model BIT as a basis for renegotiation and the establishment of the IMC to oversee 
processes. 
The following chapter will be a comparison of the situation that exists in Kenya now 
which has a bearing on its outdated BITs to the situation that existed in South Africa 
prior to review. The chapter will also indicate the lessons that could be learnt from 
the South African experience that could be applied to the Kenyan context. 
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Chapter 4: Comparison between the Kenyan and South African BIT experience 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter will compare the current situation as it exists in Kenya, which has a 
bearing on its outdated BITs to the situation that existed in South Africa prior to 
review. The aim would be to identify the factors that could also prompt Kenya to 
initiate a review process of its BITs. In addition to this, the chapter will also highlight 
the lessons that Kenya could learn from South Africa‟s experience. 
4.1 Comparison between Kenya‟s situation with BITs to South Africa‟s BIT 
experience 
To provide a better understanding of Kenya‟s current situation with BITs, it is 
important to provide a brief history of Kenya in this regard. In the 1970s, Kenya was 
a prime choice for foreign investors seeking to establish a presence in East Africa.283 
It was during this period that Kenya signed its first BIT with the Netherlands (1970). 
However, during the 1980s, Kenya‟s combination of politically driven economic 
policies, rampant corruption, government malfeasance, sub-standard public services 
and poor infrastructure discouraged FDI.284 This spanned over a period of three 
decades with Kenya being a comparative under performer in attracting FDI.285 The 
BITs that Kenya signed with the UK, Italy and Germany were signed during this 
period that Kenya was receiving low FDI.  
In 2002, the newly elected government administration (the 2002-2013 government 
administration) was handed the reins of a country in crisis following a long period of 
poor economic and industrial policies and where rampant corruption contributed to a 
weak investment climate.286 This new administration was confronted with the need to 
drastically improve policies and provide a favourable setting for private investment to 
generate wealth and reduce poverty.287 Based on this situation, the Kenyan 
government made the attraction of FDI a priority.288 Among the measures that the 
government sought to implement in order to attract FDI was to award many 
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incentives such as the tax incentives indicated in chapter 2 among other reforms that 
were aimed at attracting foreign investors into the country.289 
However, despite the efforts that the Kenyan Government has made in trying to 
attract FDI, the amount of FDI that the country has received has not played an 
important role in the Kenyan economy.290 Policy makers in Kenya have attributed 
this low level of FDI to low investor confidence resulting from security and corruption 
among other factors.291 As was noted in section 2.2, Kenya has security concerns 
that arise from terrorist attacks that come from Kenya‟s neighbouring Somalia. 
Research has indicated that these terrorist activities have negatively affected the FDI 
levels in Kenya.292 Other security concerns can be attributed to the 2007 political 
violence that erupted in Kenya that dissuaded both tourists and potential investors 
from coming to Kenya.293 In addition to this, corruption in Kenya is said to be 
pervasive and entrenched, and it is also considered one of the major impediments to 
doing business in Kenya.294 
From this brief history, it is evident that Kenya‟s current situation in some way 
resembles South Africa‟s situation before the review. What is evident thus far is that 
both countries entered into their BITs during a period in which the countries needed 
to attract FDI for economic recovery. What is also evident is that both governments 
came into power at a time when each respective country needed major economic 
reforms and other policies to address the social issues that were prevalent at the 
time. To this end, the new administration in Kenya enacted a new constitution in 
2010.295 Kenya‟s constitution compares to South Africa‟s experience with its 1996 
constitution in that; both constitutions required the implementation of various reforms 
that are of a similar nature. For example, as discussed in chapter 3, the South 
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African constitution obligated its government to create a more open and equitable 
society based on human rights. This resulted in the initiation of the BEE programs 
and the MPRDA. Kenya‟s constitution likewise required the Kenyan government to 
conduct various discussions on investment related Bills including the Mining Bill that 
is set to replace the Mining Act of 1940.296 Kenya‟s Mining Bill includes reforms in its 
mining sector which like the MPRDA of South Africa may not be welcome to foreign 
investors. Kenya‟s government has already been warned of the prospect of legal 
action in the event that the Mining Bill is enacted.297  The arguments raised against 
the Mining Bill, and the basis of the legal threats were previously discussed in 
section 2.3. 
South Africa has been a respondent to two BIT claims that have been discussed in 
the previous chapter. Kenya, on the other hand, has not been a respondent to any 
BIT claims. However, Kenya has been a respondent to an ICSID claim based on an 
arbitration clause in a concession agreement. In the World Duty-Free Company v 
The Republic of Kenya case, the investor paid a bribe to the then prime minister of 
Kenya to obtain the right to build and operate duty-free stores at Kenyan airports.298 
A contract was entered into, and the investor spent approximately US$ 27 million 
building the stores.299 The investment was subsequently subject to expropriation by 
a newly instituted government that prompted the investor to seek legal recourse.300 
The tribunal, in this case, rendered the investment agreement secured through 
bribery illegal, a ruling that was in favour of the Kenyan government.301 
                                                          
296
 Ong`onge L ‘Why Kenya should not sign any more Bilateral Investment Treaties’ available at 
http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/blog/why-kenya-should-not-sign-any-more-bilateral-investment-treaties (accessed 
20 March 2015). 
297
 King and Spalding Client Alert ‘Recent Developments: Kenya- What legal options are available to mining 
companies’ available at 
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca082013.pdf(accessed 20 March 2015). 
298
 Utterback M, Carroll M & Rich E ‘Bribery and Corruption in Foreign Investment: Investor beware’ available 
at http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2014/08/articles/dispute-resolution/bribery-and-corruption-in-foreign-
innvestments-investor-beware/ (accessed 20 March 2015). 
299
 Utterback M, Carroll M & Rich E ‘Bribery and Corruption in Foreign Investment: Investor beware’ available 
at http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2014/08/articles/dispute-resolution/bribery-and-corruption-in-foreign-
innvestments-investor-beware/ (accessed 20 March 2015). 
300
 Utterback M, Carroll M & Rich E ‘Bribery and Corruption in Foreign Investment: Investor beware’ available 
at http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2014/08/articles/dispute-resolution/bribery-and-corruption-in-foreign-
innvestments-investor-beware/ (accessed 20 March 2015). 
301
 Utterback M, Carroll M & Rich E ‘Bribery and Corruption in Foreign Investment: Investor beware’ available 
at http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2014/08/articles/dispute-resolution/bribery-and-corruption-in-foreign-
innvestments-investor-beware/ (accessed 20 March 2015). 
 
 
 
 
 61 
With reference to the case mentioned above, the outcome could have been different 
for the Kenyan government had the investor been protected by a BIT. Although there 
is evidence of a BIT claim that was dismissed at the ICSID due to corrupt dealings of 
the foreign investor (Metal-Tech Ltd v Republic of Uzbekistan),302 the earlier 
chapters of this thesis have demonstrated that ICSID awards in BIT claims are 
subject to inconsistencies and as such, the outcome of such a case had there been 
a BIT in force would have been uncertain. Yankee expresses the same view in his 
comment on the World Duty Free case in which he states that, an ICSID tribunal in a 
BIT dispute might look to the BIT language to locate an express or implicit anti-
corruption rule.303 Where there is no express mention of bribery or corruption and the 
BIT is read to implicitly incorporate the term, the interpretation may be subject to 
inconsistencies.304 
In the same way in which South Africa developed its legal, regulatory framework 
from the time that it signed its first BITs, so too has Kenya developed its legal 
system. Similar to the South African constitution, Kenya‟s constitution provides 
protection from the expropriation of private property with the exception of takings in 
the public interest.305 Kenya also has sectoral regimes that cover a broad range of 
sectors with legislation that has a bearing on investors‟ interests. An example 
includes the Land Acquisition Act, which governs compensation and the process of 
acquiring land.306 However, unlike South Africa‟s open jurisdiction to providing 
investment protection that is consistent with the highest standards, Kenyan courts 
have been described as emerging, with weak institutional capacity and inadequate 
transparency.307 
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Apart from these legal developments, like South Africa, Kenya is also developing into 
a capital exporting country.308 This is principally in the sectors of tourism, 
manufacturing, retail, finance and media, making the most of its access to the East 
African Community (EAC) region.309 There are also reports that domestic investment 
pulled ahead of FDI in the previous years and has become a key determinant of 
Kenya‟s economic performance and prospects.310 Kenya has also developed into the 
largest economy amongst members of the EAC.311 In spite of these developments, 
as was noted earlier, FDI in Kenya has contributed little to the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of the country, that is unlike South Africa. With this in mind it is 
important to point out that Kenya does not have the same type of resources that 
South Africa has. For example, Kenya‟s economy is driven largely by agriculture, 
manufacturing, tourism and real estate sectors.312 These sectors are highly subject 
to commodity market price, supply and demand forces, the countries reputation, 
stability, safety to mention a few. Whereas on the other hand, South Africa has 
virtual monopolises and is the continent‟s biggest economy.313 This indicates that the 
push and pull factors for FDI in Kenya and South Africa are not the same. 
Similar to South Africa, Kenya has also taken part in investment treaty discussions at 
various levels giving Kenya international exposure to the realities of BITs. Kenya is 
taking part in the review of the draft EAC model investment treaty following concerns 
that it does not provide adequate protection for local investors.314 Kenya also 
participated in the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
negotiations for the COMESA Common Investment Area (CCIA).315 Additionally, 
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Kenya is also observing the global trends regarding BITs and how other countries 
have responded to issues relating to their BITs, including South Africa. 
There are many other factors that could be considered for comparison on matters 
regarding BITs from South Africa‟s experience and Kenya‟s current situation. 
However, the factors that have been discussed above illustrate how Kenya‟s current 
situation can relate to South Africa‟s experience. Furthermore, these factors highlight 
the necessity for Kenya to learn from the experience that South Africa faced. 
4.2 Lessons that Kenya can learn from South Africa‟s experience 
There are many lessons that Kenya could learn from South Africa‟s BIT experience. 
From the brief history of South Africa‟s BITs discussed in section 3.1, Kenya could 
learn of the need to perform a thorough analysis of the risks and benefits of BITs 
before entering into them. This would ensure that the agreements are entered into 
on well thought out decisions. Kenya could use this same principle in weighing the 
options available to them before renewing or terminating any of its BITs. This 
ensures that the country does not bind itself to agreements that may later have 
adverse effects on its development. Learning from South Africa‟s experience, it 
would be necessary for Kenya to include the expertise of lawyers and all relevant 
government stakeholders in the drafting and the negotiation process of BITs. From 
South Africa‟s experience, Kenya could also learn that it needs to develop a BIT 
negotiating strategy particularly when negotiating with traditional capital exporting 
countries. As was indicated in section 3.3.1.1, South Africa signed BITs that placed 
all the obligations on the host state and awarded all the rights to the foreign 
investors. Devising a negotiating strategy would ensure that the BITs are balanced 
and that both parties get to benefit from the agreements. 
Kenya could also learn from the factors that prompted South Africa‟s review process. 
It was indicated earlier that at the time when South Africa entered into its BITs there 
was a common belief among many countries that BITs would attract FDI. It was on 
this basis that many countries like South Africa entered into BITs. This, however, 
was not true as was evident from the results of South Africa‟s review process, and 
yet South Africa had acted on the common notion that BITs attracted FDI. It was 
important for South Africa to conduct an assessment of the claims of BITs attracting 
FDI based on its own situation. The fact that other countries saw BITs as attracting 
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FDI in their countries did not mean the same would apply to South Africa, as such, a 
more cautious approach needed to have been taken. Kenya could also use this 
lesson in making an independent, unbiased decision regarding its BITs bearing in 
mind all the criticisms that have been highlighted about them. Kenya will need to 
assess BITs and their effect in its country to examine whether any of the allegations 
about BITs are indeed true in Kenya‟s context. 
South Africa perceived BITs to be instruments that attract FDI and hastily entered 
into BITs in the hope of attracting such FDI. However, South Africa‟s perspective of 
BITs in the 21st century has changed since it no longer views those same treaties as 
sources of attracting FDI given that the country is already receiving FDI from 
countries that do not have BITs with South Africa. This is further corroborated by 
evidence from other countries such as Brazil that receive FDI even without ratifying 
any of the BITs that the country signed. From this, Kenya needs to understand that 
the perspective and rational that countries have when they sign BITs changes over 
time. Thus, BITs will need to be revaluated continuously to make sure that the 
motivating factors for concluding them are still relevant. 
In addition to this, Kenya could also learn that with each major development that the 
country undergoes, it should align its treaty provisions with such changes. For 
example South Africa enacted a new constitution that may be regarded as a major 
development in the country. The new constitution includes various provisions that in 
some way have a bearing on its foreign investment treaties.  The constitution 
provides for the protection of property rights and also states the conditions and value 
to which compensation for expropriation would be awarded. The constitution also 
provides for the BEE programs that the country has had to implement.  As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, these constitutional provisions contradict some of 
the provisions in South Africa‟s BITs and also result in other policies that were not in 
line with the country‟s BIT obligations. Economic developments also serve as 
another example of major developments that the country will need to align with its 
treaty obligations. As South Africa developed from being a capital importing country 
to also being a capital exporting country, it had to re-align its BIT obligations with its 
new developments. The same treaties that the country would have signed when it 
was still just a capital importing country would not cater for the new developments 
the country would have undergone as a capital exporting nation. 
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Another lesson that Kenya could learn from South Africa‟s experience is the fact that 
Kenya should not wait for a dispute to be brought against the country over its BIT 
obligations by foreign investors.  Poulsen points out that, decision makers in many 
developing countries often ignore experiences in other countries which in turn leads 
to considerable risk-neglect until hit by their first claim.316 As was noted in section 
3.2, South Africa did not initiate the review process of its BITs until the state was a 
respondent to the Foresti case. The Swiss case against South Africa was an 
indication that a failure to observe BIT obligations will result in costly awards against 
the host state. Such situations would be worsened by the fact that legal action under 
BITs is extremely costly. Moreover, having a decision in one or more ICSID disputes 
being made against a host state could cause broader damage if outside investors 
begin to question the environment within the host state.317  All this goes to highlight 
how important it is for the Kenyan government to take the necessary action 
regarding its BITs before any legal dispute emanates from the treaties. 
Kenya could also learn from South Africa‟s participation at both regional and 
international levels. From such international and regional exposure, Kenya could 
learn about other countries‟ issues with BITs and incorporate this knowledge in its 
BIT policy framework. According to Malik, a debate is healthier in regional dynamics 
compared to a bilateral context.318 Malik attributes her views to new model texts and 
the COMESA treaty that shows African countries that they are not tied to the old 
European model and that there are ways for innovation in terms of making the 
treaties more balanced.319 As was noted earlier, Kenya is also participating in the 
EAC negotiations for a model treaty and it is also a member of COMESA 
negotiations, so therefore, Kenya could enhance its knowledge from the participation 
at such levels and incorporate that knowledge into its BIT policies. 
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Kenya could also gain from the measures that South Africa adopted after its review 
process. The South African PPIB that is set to govern investments both foreign and 
domestic has faced huge amounts of criticism. The PPIB has been criticised for 
reducing the amount of compensation to be paid in the event of expropriation from 
market value to the deemed fair and equitable value.320 The PPIB has also been 
criticised for limiting disputes to domestic dispute resolution mechanisms and 
subjecting foreign investors to the same cumbersome regulatory environment to 
redress past inequalities as imposed on local investors.321 Some of the critics of the 
PPIB include the American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) that is formed by 
South Africans in Johannesburg322 and the South Africa-German Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry which warned that the termination of the BITs could have a 
negative impact on investor confidence.323 The PPIB has also been criticised for its 
lack of ability to protect South Africa‟s outbound investments.324 In addition to this, 
South Africa will still be subject to its obligations under the Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Trade and Investment (2006) 
regardless of the fact that the PPIB is enacted or not.325 This protocol requires 
member states to create a favourable investment climate in the region by, among 
other actions, not expropriating investments except for a public purpose against 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and allowing access to international 
arbitration.326 Such requirements are not in line with the new PPIB that is set to be 
promulgated. With this in mind, Kenya could learn of the shortcomings of resorting to 
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domesticating BITs and thereby seek to lessen the consequences or avoid the 
option. 
Another lesson that could be learnt from the PPIB that South Africa seeks to utilise is 
that such a measure could be useful if the legal and judiciary system of the country is 
of a high standard. As was previously discussed, South Africa‟s judiciary system is 
regarded as being equivalent to international standards. As such, South Africa can 
resort to domesticating its BITs with the expectation that foreign investors would be 
confident in their judicial system. Strengthening the role of national courts could 
mean that foreign investors may be required to submit disputes that arise during the 
course of foreign investment to the investment host state's national courts in the first 
instance rather than being able to go straight to international tribunals.327 
Encouraging such states to develop their legal regimes in order to cope with the 
demands of settling international investment disputes will also enable them to free 
themselves from the sometimes arbitrary rulings in international investment tribunals 
that often award huge amounts of compensation to foreign investors, which the state 
has to pay.328 This requires Kenya to learn the importance of upgrading its system so 
that it meets international standards and can settle investment disputes in-country 
rather than having them settled outside their jurisdiction. 
Kenya could also learn from the manner in which South Africa terminated its BITs. 
South Africa has been criticised for the lack of adequate communication and re-
assurance to the state parties when it terminated its BITs.329 The EU ambassador 
was quoted as stating that the decision to terminate the BITs with EU countries 
should have been a result of broader consultation.330 The World Trade Institute 
International Investment Initiative Director was also quoted as stating that the 
process through which South Africa decided to terminate its BITs had in fact 
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impacted FDI confidence.331 This may be because the decision was made 
unilaterally by South Africa not appearing to have considered the possibility of at 
least attempting to renegotiate the terms of the terminated BITs.332 Moreover, the 
termination was done before the enactment of the PPIB that was meant to replace 
the protection offered by BITs.333 Kenya could learn from the criticism South Africa 
faced so as to avoid the same situation for Kenya. Kenya could also learn from the 
fact that South Africa did not withdraw from any active treaty in an effort to protect 
diplomatic relations.334 
4.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it can be noted that Kenya‟s current situation does not differ 
substantially from the one that existed in South Africa prior to the review of its BITs. 
Having such a similar situation to a country that has reviewed its BITs, Kenya should 
learn from the experiences that South Africa underwent. These lessons were drawn 
from the factors that necessitated the review, the manner in which the review was 
undertaken and the measures that were taken as a result of South Africa‟s review 
process. 
The next chapter will recommend possible measures that Kenya‟s government could 
implement with respect to the country‟s outdated BITs. The chapter will recommend 
actions that the Kenyan government can take in light of their own situation. This will 
also be the concluding chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Recommendations 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the main issues of the study and also provides 
recommendations for Kenya‟s government with respect to its outdated BITs. 
5.1 Summary 
The study presented a comparative analysis between Kenya and South Africa 
regarding BITs signed prior to the 21st century. In particular, the study examined 
factors such as how these BITs have been considered as restricting policy space of 
the host state, how these BITs have been unfairly skewed towards foreign investors 
and how BITs, in general, have resulted in a large number of cases at ICISD.  
The analysis of Kenya‟s BITs revealed that some of the BITs omitted to define 
important terms and where the terms were defined in the other treaties; the 
definitions could be subject to very broad interpretations. The analysis also revealed 
that there is not enough detail on what the fair and equitable treatment provision 
entails or enough detail to limit the scope of application of the most favoured nation 
provision that may result in undesirable interpretations for the Kenyan government. 
Various cases were presented that show how the BIT provisions that were 
highlighted could affect Kenya, and these cases pointed out the uncertainties that 
plague the dispute settlement forums that are mainly used in investment disputes. 
Kenya‟s BITs place a limit on the Kenyan government‟s policy space in matters 
regarding the assistance of its own nationals due to the national treatment provision 
and on promulgating new legislation that affects investors‟ investments. 
Furthermore, the study also revealed that South Africa entered into its BITs without a 
proper appreciation of what the South African government was signing up for. The 
desire of South Africa‟s government to attract FDI and eliminate all forms of racial 
inequalities resulted in South Africa being sued at international tribunals, prompting 
the initiation of the review of South Africa‟s BITs. The review process of South 
Africa‟s first generation BITs was targeted to specific areas with the participation of 
various stakeholders. The review revealed that the BIT provisions were not what 
South Africa desired to be bound to, as some of the provisions were a direct violation 
of South Africa‟s constitution and South African legislation. With this in mind, South 
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Africa made numerous recommendations regarding its outdated BITs which involved 
the development of a new investment Act, the termination of South Africa‟s first 
generation BITs, the suggestion to refrain from entering into more BITs unless there 
were compelling economic and political reasons to do so, to develop a new model 
BIT as a basis for renegotiation and to establish the IMC to oversee processes. 
The comparison of Kenya‟s current situation to the one that existed in South Africa 
before the review is substantially the same. Having such a similar situation to a 
country that has reviewed its BITs, Kenya has numerous lessons to learn from South 
Africa.These lessons were drawn from the factors that necessitated the review, the 
manner in which the review was undertaken and the measures that were taken as a 
result of South Africa‟s review process. The following section describes specific 
recommendations for Kenya in light of South Africa‟s experiences with dealing with 
BITs signed prior to the 21st century. 
5.2 Recommendations 
5.2.1 Review BITs 
The first recommendation for Kenya is that it should carry out an extensive BIT 
review process that is targeted at uncovering specific aspects. Kenya‟s BIT review 
could be aimed at ascertaining if BITs still fall in line with Kenya‟s domestic 
legislative agenda and the country‟s goals of attracting FDI. Kenya could also assess 
the vulnerabilities in the language of its current BITs that would open up Kenya to 
litigation. In addition, Kenya could also determine if BITs will attract enough FDI to 
balance the risks of claims that could be brought upon Kenya. Whilst Kenya is similar 
to South Africa in that they are both African countries seeking to increase their FDI 
and bolster their economies, each country has its own unique aspects indicated in 
the previous chapter. With this in mind, even though Kenya can take lessons from 
South Africa, carrying out their own BIT review will help them understand whether 
BITs work for their specific situation that is the combination of their characteristics 
which make Kenya a unique country. Based on the results of the review, Kenya 
could terminate BITs currently enforced, maintain a BIT system or find alternative 
measures of protecting and promoting FDI. Each of these measures shall be further 
discussed below. 
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5.2.2 Terminate current BITs 
Kenya should consider terminating its current BITs. All of Kenya‟s BITs that have 
been discussed in this thesis allow for the termination of the agreements upon 
written notice within the prescribed time frame indicated in the BITs. Kenya could 
therefore serve notices of termination to its BIT contracting partners. In this regard, 
Kenya should take into consideration the diplomatic downsides of unilaterally 
terminating BITs without offering the contracting partners the possibility of 
renegotiating the agreements.335 With this in mind it would be important for Kenya to 
assess the benefits of maintaining the BIT system. Alternatively, Kenya could 
terminate the agreements upon a mutual agreement by the negotiating partners. 
This would ensure that Kenya resorts to a measure that is beneficial for the Kenyan 
government. 
5.2.3 Maintaining a BIT system 
5.2.3.1 Benefits of maintaining the BIT system 
As was mentioned above, Kenya should also assess the benefits of maintaining a 
BIT system that is specific for Kenya and may be used as a basis for renegotiating 
its old BITs. Some of the factors that Kenya could consider in assessing BIT 
importance for Kenya include the fact that some investors do consider BITs before 
investing in a country as is evident from issues such as treaty shopping for instance, 
where investors choose to invest in countries that have a BIT with the host country 
rather than investing in their home country.336 Historical experience as well as recent 
developments in parts of Latin America has also shown that resource extraction 
sectors are particularly prone to discrimination or even predatory government 
interference.337 As such, natural resource investors may take more notice of BITs. 
This is important for Kenya to consider since the country has recent discoveries of oil 
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and gas that are expected to attract the interest of many foreign investors who may 
consider having BITs with Kenya in order to protect their investments.338 
In addition to the aforementioned factors, Ginsburg indicates that it would be part of 
due diligence for an investor to look for the existence of a BIT before investing.339 If 
investors exercise such due diligence, there would be interests in the Kenyan BIT 
system from investors seeking to invest in Kenya. Moreover, empirical research has 
also shown that states with high political risk stand to gain the most inbound 
investment by concluding investment treaties.340 As was discussed previously, 
Kenya is perceived as having risk not only from terrorist attacks but also from a 
dented reputation from the 2007 political violence. Another important consideration 
for maintaining a BIT system for Kenya would be for the protection of Kenya‟s 
investments abroad. The protection that these BITs offer to investors has been 
evident in the increase in the number of cases in the last decades that may make 
investors more diligent about protecting their investments. All these advantages 
listed suggest a strong need for Kenya to maintain a BIT system. The negative 
consequences of BITs from other countries‟ experiences in the past do not mean 
that such effects cannot be avoided. Additionally, it is important to note that the result 
of an analysis of the risks and benefits of BITs in one country is not going to 
necessarily be the same as in the other. The BIT system would, however, need to be 
tailored in a manner that is favourable to Kenya‟s current situation as discussed 
further below. 
5.2.3.2 Manner in which BIT system should be drafted 
The recommended BIT system for Kenya should consist of a new model BIT that is 
formulated in a manner that caters for the shortfalls of Kenya‟s earlier BITs while 
also reflecting the country‟s developmental needs. Kenya should include the 
definitions of the terms „investment‟ and „investor‟ in the new model and ensure that 
these definitions are included in all subsequent agreements. Additionally, Kenya 
should ensure that with the terms are defined in a manner that takes into 
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consideration the disadvantages of the current BIT definitions that were discussed in 
section 2.2. For example, Kenya could expound on the criteria used in determining 
nationality rather than merely stating that it should be in accordance with national 
laws. Kenya could also express what the FIPA defines as investments in the Kenyan 
BIT model. Kenya may also elaborate further on what the fair and equitable 
treatment entails. With regards to the protection and security clause, the COMESA 
BIT model, among other newer texts, is said to have totally excluded the provision 
from the BITs.341 However, for the Kenyan government, despite its huge burden and 
the risks involved in the event that attacks are made on foreign investment property, 
Kenya could maintain the provision in its BITs as a way of signalling its true 
commitment to protecting foreign investor‟s property. The provision may be included 
with a limitation of liability for the Kenyan government. Kenya would, therefore, need 
to intensify its efforts in ensuring that it curbs terrorism so as to avoid guaranteeing 
what it cannot provide which may result in legal action. Such efforts would attract 
investments of those foreigners that have hesitated to invest in Kenya based on 
security concerns. The national treatment provision may be phrased to ensure that 
the Kenyan government may be able to assist its local industries in like 
circumstances to grow while the MFN provision may be phrased in a manner that 
indicates the extent to which the provision should apply.  
The investor-state dispute provision being included or excluded from BITs is one that 
has raised different views. As was explained in earlier chapters, the investor-state 
dispute provision is a one-way process of public law claims where only one class of 
parties (the investor) triggers use of the system by bringing claims and only the other 
class (host states) is liable to pay awards for violating the treaty.342 In South Africa, a 
group tasked with reviewing South Africa‟s policy recommended that South Africa 
omit dispute mechanisms to which investors have had direct access.343 This 
recommendation was based on the fact that South African laws provide protection of 
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investments, including how those investments are handled in the country.344 It has 
been reported that the EU is engaged in a heated debate over the value of investor-
state dispute provisions as it negotiates with the US over a trade and investment 
deal.345 Germany has joined France in stating that it would oppose this mechanism 
in the transatlantic deal.346 Many other countries have opposed the inclusion of this 
provision in their BITs. However, Malaysia affirmed benefits of investor-state 
arbitration to developing countries by publishing a report in which it confirmed its 
continued commitment to investor-state arbitration to promote its economic 
developments.347 The Malaysian report was an official response to critics of the 
mechanism and this report further advised states that have for various reasons, 
decided to opt out and would-be reformers should refrain from tinkering with the 
system and undermining its stability to fulfil its intended purpose for those that wish 
to use it.348 Malaysia has not alone in affirming the relevant of the investor-state 
dispute provision in its BITs as there is evidence on the UNCTAD Investment Policy 
Hub of new BITs and IIAs that are still being concluded with the investor-state 
dispute provision.349 Considering these varying views on the provision, the 
recommendation for Kenya is that they should consider maintaining the investor-
state dispute provision in its model BIT for reasons discussed below. 
Allee and Peinhardt express the view that, home governments will see less need to 
rely on ICSID when the host country possesses greater respect for the rule of law.350 
As was discussed previously, Kenya‟s judicial system is one that is still emerging 
with a new constitution that has brought about reforms that are still to be 
implemented. The effects of such reforms are yet to be evaluated by prospective 
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foreign investors. In addition to this, in Kenya, investors have a poor opinion of the 
court system.351 The World Bank‟s World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
indicates that 74 percent of investors rated the overall quality of the court system as 
„slightly bad‟, „bad‟ or „very bad‟ as opposed to „slightly good‟, „good‟ or „very good‟.352 
There have also been several incidents in which high court and appeal court judges 
were suspended for alleged corruption.353 With such situations and perceptions of 
Kenya‟s judicial system, maintaining the investor-state dispute provision would 
provide confidence to foreign investors knowing that they will have access to an 
independent and fair ruling in the event of a dispute. It is also important to note that 
the investor-state arbitration also has its disadvantages to the investor that may also 
deter the investor from resorting to the mechanism unless it is necessary. The 
mechanism entails significant costs for the investor, costs that may not be recouped 
from any eventual arbitral award and it also serves to rupture those relationships 
between the investor and the state which could even put in question the investor‟s 
relationships with other countries that are sympathetic to the host country 
respondent.354 With this in mind, Kenya could maintain the investor-state arbitration 
provision in its BIT model.  
With regards to the manner in which the provision should be phrased in Kenya‟s 
BITs, the new model BIT should avoid pre-consent to investor initiated arbitration 
which is evident in Article 8 (1) of the UK BIT that has been discussed in chapter 2. 
Pre-consent to investor initiated enforceable arbitration for a wide range of 
investment disputes may seriously constrain the host states policy autonomy.355 It is 
for this reason that a number of states have sought to limit their exposure to adverse 
awards and to preserve a greater degree of policy autonomy vis-à-vis foreign 
investors by offering carefully tailored promises to consent to arbitration rather than 
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actual pre-consent.356 Kenya could also consider making the dispute settlement 
provision only relevant to certain clauses of the BIT. 
With the suggestion of a new BIT model in mind, Kenya could seek to renegotiate its 
old BITs and enter into new BITs only where necessary for the Kenyan government 
to do so. In drafting this new model BIT, Kenya should include the participation of all 
stakeholders that may directly or indirectly be affected by any of the provisions in the 
BIT model and the participation of the public. It will also be important for Kenya to 
consider raising awareness of their BITs to Kenyan citizens. The drafters of this new 
model should anticipate how the treaty provisions will be understood by outside 
users and, above all, by arbitration panels.357 The draft model should be construed 
with wording that carries legal effects in a manner that caters for Kenyan 
investments abroad while also including other development needs that the Kenyan 
government may wish to achieve. All this should be aimed at achieving a balance 
between the investor‟s rights and the host states obligations. The Kenyan 
government should also ensure that there is a central body that governs issues that 
relate to BITs; a suggestion that was akin to the IMC that was established in South 
Africa to manage the negotiation of BITs. This shift in BIT treaty formation will 
thereby require Kenya to better articulate its individual needs in BITs and help the 
country negotiate the agreements from a position of strength.358 
5.2.4 Capacity-building 
The recommendation for Kenya to adopt an effective new model BIT necessarily 
requires that Kenya, consider capacity-building for all the officials that would be 
involved in handling BITs. By building capacity and increasing awareness of the 
consequences of concluding investment treaties, African states will, carefully 
examine the meaning and consider the provisions before signing such treaties.359 
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This would go a long way in avoiding disputes involving African states.360 The African 
International Legal Awareness (AILA) was founded in 2011 and has organised BIT 
training workshops for government lawyers with some of the training being held 
within countries that would have requested such training.361 The Trade Law Centre 
for Southern Africa (Tralac) has also organised BIT training workshops for 
government officials such as the workshop that was held in Zimbabwe on BIT 
negotiation training in August 2014.362 The International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) has also conducted training courses for African government 
officials‟ in-country and at a regional level.363 Kenya should also ensure that its 
government officials are well trained and informed on matters regarding BITs. 
5.2.5 Alternative measures 
In the event that BITs are determined to be ineffective, Kenya could come up with 
creative solutions that are not BIT-model dependent. For example, the Kenyan 
government could also consider the possibility of resorting to investment contracts. 
Investment contracts can be regarded as a form of legal instrument that could help 
alleviate investor concerns about political risks and yet still allow host states to 
moderate their commitments on a case by case basis.364 Investment contracts are 
also beneficial in that they provide the investor with the opportunity to spell out his 
rights and obligations vis-à-vis the state with far greater precision and completeness 
than the rights and obligations contained in the typical BIT which represents a one-
size-fits-all solution that is unlikely to ideally suit all investors.365 Such contracts could 
also bear the same standards as the BITs including recourse to international 
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arbitration backed by the New York or ICSID Conventions.366 With such an 
alternative, the Kenyan government could still provide investors with the protection 
they desire given that BITs are mainly sought for the protection they provide to 
foreign investments. Kenya‟s outward investors could also seek to negotiate such 
contracts stating the terms upon which the investment is to be governed in the host 
country. 
5.2.5 Other recommendations 
In addition to either maintaining a BIT system or signing investment contracts, Kenya 
could also work on developing its judiciary system so that it meets international 
standards. By so doing, Kenya could thereafter work at governing its investment, 
relying more on its domestic legislation rather than international instruments that 
have negative consequences that were highlighted in the earlier chapters. 
Strengthening the role of national courts could mean that foreign investors may be 
required to submit disputes that arise during the course of foreign investment to the 
investment host states national courts, rather than being able to go straight to 
international tribunals.367 BITs could then in future be re-negotiated to provide for 
domestic dispute resolution. 
5.3 Final Remarks 
Kenya should review its BITs targeted at ascertaining if BITs still fall in line with 
Kenya‟s legislation, ascertaining the vulnerabilities in the language of current BITs 
and ascertaining if BITs will attract enough FDI to balance the risks of claims that 
could be brought upon Kenya. Based on the outcome of the review, Kenya should 
consider terminating its BITs that are currently enforced, maintain a BIT system to be 
used were necessary, work on building capacity and consider the possibilities of 
alternative measures that are not BIT-model dependant. 
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